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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ROBERT BELTRAN and 
DOROTHY DEE CARPENTER, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
CaseNo.20010164-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendants appeal their individual convictions for aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (1999), entered as second degree felony 
convictions pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendants' motions to suppress evidence on the 
ground that some items were in plain view and others were seized pursuant to a lawfully 
issued search warrant which, when read with its accompanying affidavit, sufficiently 
described the items to be seized? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A bifurcated standard applies in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress: the trial 
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error; its legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322, \ 7, 57 P.3d 1098. 
2. Have defendants established that the trial court plainly erred in the voir dire of four 
jurors regarding their familial relationship with each other, their relatives' government 
employment, and in one case, the juror's legal residence? 
Because defendants did not challenge the four jurors and stipulated that the voir dire 
was adequate, defendants must establish that (a) the trial court erred in conducting the voir 
dire, (b) the error was obvious, (c) the error actually prejudiced the outcome of the trial, and 
(d) defendants did not invite the error. See State v. Bloom field, 2003 UT App 3, f 7,63 P.3d 
110 (reaffirming invited error limitation on plain error standard). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion alleging juror 
misconduct on the ground that the exchanges between two jurors and the prosecutor's wife 
were, in one case, common courtesy and, in the other, about a community play and, 
consequently, insufficient to justify a new trial? 
A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but 
the legal standards applied by the court in reaching that determination are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, f 45, 44 P.3d 805. 
4. Is the evidence sufficient to support defendants' convictions for aggravated arson? 
Reversal is warranted only if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he or she was convicted." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 18 (citation omitted). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Resolution of this appeal involves the following provisions, which are attached in 
Addendum A, together with other provisions cited in the body of this brief: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (1999) - Aggravated Arson; 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-5-106 (2002) -Justice Court Judge Authority; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-17.5 (2002) - Authority of Magistrate; 
UTAHR. CRIM. P. 18- Selection of Jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Carpenter owned the Frontier Barbecue Restaurant in Kanab, Utah, and 
resided in the building's basement apartment (T 494: 204; T 497: 1022, 1103).' Her "best 
friend," Defendant Beltran, worked as her cook and resided in a separate bedroom in the 
apartment (T 497:1009,1013,1034-35,1103). On March 24,1998, a fire destroyed the roof 
and attic of the building and damaged a bathroom on the main floor. On July 14, 1998, 
defendants were charged with aggravated arson (BR 1-2; CR 1-2).2 
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress a small piece of Sheetrock found in the 
bed of Beltran's truck, photographs and a video of the burnt roof and attic, and fourteen items 
seized from the restaurant and apartment pursuant to a search warrant (BR 92-99, 104-15; 
1
 Defendants were separately charged, but their cases joined for trial. Pleadings 
Files No. 981600101 (Beltran) and No. 981600100 (Carpenter) are respectively 
designated "BR" and "CR." Transcript citations are "T." 
2
 Aggravated arson is the intentional damaging of a habitable structure, that is, a 
building used for lodging or business, by means of fire. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-
101(2) &-103(1 )(a) (1999). 
:
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CR 101-04,112-27,155-56,164-66). Following an evidentiary hearing, defendants' motions 
were granted in part and seven items suppressed as being outside the scope of the warrant 
(BR 149-50; CR 196-97). At the same time, the motions were denied in part because two 
items were in plain view from a position in the parking lot and the remaining seven items fell 
within the parameters of the lawfully issued warrant (BR 166-75; CR 198,275-77,294-303). 
Motions for reconsideration were also denied (BR 153-56; CR 278-81). 
A jury trial commenced on June 19,2000 (BR 243-49; CR 416-21,394). Prospective 
jurors were questioned (T 494: 11-163). All but one of the jurors challenged for cause by 
defendants were excused (T 494:65,104,106-09,116,119-22,125,129,143,147,136,145, 
148,153,154,156). Counsel stipulated to the qualifications of the remaining jurors (T 494: 
119, 117-19, 147-48, 156-57). Defendants were granted six peremptory challenges, but 
chose not to strike the jurors they now challenge (T 494: 157, 163). 
Both parties presented multiple trial witnesses, including expert witnesses, and 
introduced numerous exhibits. Defendant Beltran testified on his own behalf (T 497: 1008-
1130; TR 499: 30-48, 177-85); Defendant Carpenter chose not to testify (T 499: 48). On 
June 27, 2000, the jury convicted defendants of aggravated arson (BR 243; CR 394). 
Defendants filed a motion for new trial claiming that one juror was not a qualified 
resident and that two jurors improperly conversed with the prosecutor's wife during trial (BR 
255-56, 272-77; CR 426-27, 439, 445-50). Following an evidentiary hearing, the court 
denied the motion after finding the one juror was a Kane County resident and that the any 
exchanges between the two jurors and the prosecutor's wife was brief and amounted to no 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more than common courtesy or related only to a community play and, therefore, was 
insufficient to justify a new trial (BR 280-83,289-93; CR 453-54,459-60,464-65,473-75). 
Defendants successfully moved to have the first degree verdicts entered as second 
degree felony convictions pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402( 1) (BR 257-58,260; CR 
424-25,436). On August 7,2000, defendants were sentenced to suspended terms of one-to-
fifteen years imprisonment and placed on probation on condition they serve one year in jail 
and pay $ 18,500.00 in fines and surcharges (BR 260-68; CR 429-32). On February 22,2001, 
defendants timely appealed (BR 302; CR 484).3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
Defendants' plan to burn down the Frontier Barbeque Restaurant might have worked 
if it had not been for Dave Winkleman. Winkleman lived in Kanab, Utah, but worked in 
Page, Arizona (T 494:201). Every workday, he left Kanab early in the morning. March 24, 
1998, was no exception (T 494: 201-02). At 4:30 a.m., as he was leaving Kanab, he noticed 
a strange light at the Frontier Restaurant (T 494: 202). Driving closer, he saw flames under 
the eaves of the southwest corner of the roof and realized the building was on fire (T 494: 
203). He immediately drove to the nearest house and asked the occupant to call 911 (T 494: 
3
 A timely motion for new trial tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. See 
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). Here, defendants' original motion for new trial was premature (BR 
255-56; CR 426-27). See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (imposing a 10-day filing period after 
sentencing or such other time set by the court within the 10-day period). At sentencing, 
the court granted defendants 30 days to refile their motion (BR 267; CR 437). The court 
ruled that the renewed motion was timely (BR 270-71, 278-79; CR 442-22,451-52). The 
motion was ultimately denied on February 22, 2001 (BR 289-93; CR 473-75). 
4
 Defendants fail to marshal the evidence. See Point IV, infra. The State presents 
the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 2. 
5 
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202-03). He drove back to the restaurant and pounded on its doors because he knew 
defendants lived in the basement (T 494: 204). No one responded (T 494: 205, 209). 
A few minutes later, John Martin, a volunteer Kanab City fireman, arrived (T 494: 
205). Martin turned off the propane gas line to the building and joined Winkleman in 
pounding on the doors (T 494: 205-06; T 495: 265). After another few minutes, Police 
Officer Brent Smith arrived (T 494: 205,231-32). The three entered the restaurant through 
the closed but unlocked french door at the back of the building (T 494: 206, 233).5 
Smoke was everywhere (T 494: 207, 214, 234). On the main floor, where the 
restaurant was located, a ceiling board which normally covered a 2 x 2 foot attic access was 
missing (T 494: 207,234-35; T 495: 286-87,289,403,416-17,424; T 497: 848). The attic 
was on fire (T 494:208,214,234,243). Smith was concerned that defendants might still be 
in the basement, but could not find the basement stairs due to the smoke (T 494: 232, 236). 
Worried that the attic or roof might collapse, they left the building without searching for 
defendants (T 494: 208, 236, 243-44). 
Alan Alldredge, the Kanab City Fire Chief, arrived within minutes (T 495: 262-64). 
He briefly went into the building with Smith and saw what the others had seen through the 
attic access: "dense, dark smoke and fire" (T 495: 266-69).6 Two fire trucks and thirteen 
5
 There were no signs of forced entry: the back door (the french door) was closed, 
but unlocked and the front door, side entrance, back gate, and fence were locked (T 494: 
233; T 495: 266, 319,414-15; T 497: 953). Defendants claimed that a photograph of the 
back door, taken five months after the fire, showed signs of forced entry (T 499: 92-93). 
6
 Alldredge and Smith saw burning wood and smoke, but no indications of an 
electrical fire (T 494: 235; T 495: 269). Alldredge then turned off the power (T 495: 266). 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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firemen arrived (T 495: 270, 302). Most of the firemen attacked the spreading attic fire, but 
Alldredge directed a couple into the basement (T 495: 271 -72,401 -03). The firemen radioed 
back that Alldredge "better come down" because the basement "looked really suspicious" 
(T 495: 273-74, 423). Unlike the firemen in full protective suits, Alldredge re-entered the 
building without a protective mask (T 495: 274). As he descended the stairs, he smelled a 
"paint thinner type smell" (T 495: 278-80). The smell was so strong that it hurt his eyes and 
inhibited his breathing; after 30 seconds, he had to exit (T 495: 274).7 
Alldredge put on protective gear, got his camera, and returned to the basement (T 495: 
274-75, 281). In the southwest bedroom, Carpenter's bedroom, a large dresser was pushed 
out of place and its drawers removed (T 495: 276; T 497: 1102). Some of the drawers were 
stacked end-to-end on top of the dresser to the ceiling; the remaining drawers surrounded the 
bottom of the dresser (T 495: 276, 37, 421-22). A large section of the Sheetrock ceiling, 
measuring 2 x 4 feet, was cut out directly above the dresser (T 495: 277). The cut-out 
Sheetrock was not in the bedroom (T 495: 276, 324). Some type of flammable liquid had 
been poured "throughout" the dresser, including on the few clothes left in its drawers (T 495: 
336, 454-55; T 496: 688-89).8 See Addendum B (Photographs). 
7
 Alldredge realized what he smelled might be accelerant, a flammable solvent (a 
petroleum distillate) intentionally introduced to a location to spread a fire more quickly (T 
495: 278; T 496: 585, 687-88; T 499: 78-79). See State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, \ 
10 n.2, 58 P.3d 879 (referring to typical accelerants). Objects which burn but are 
normally part of the location, such framing, ventilation systems, and oxygen, are 
classified as the "natural fuel load"(T 496: 584-85; T 499: 78-79). 
8
 Wood burns much faster than Sheetrock (T 496: 657). The cut-out hole and 
accelerant-soaked wooden dresser would have quickly moved the fire between the main 
floor and basement if the attic fire had not been extinguished (T 496: 656-57). 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 x 4 inch boards were on the bedroom floor and led from the dresser, out the 
bedroom door, and down the hallway to the northwest bedroom "like a trail between the two 
bedrooms" (T 495: 278, 284, 418-19, 455-56). "Fuel" was apparent on the boards (T 495: 
455-56).9 See Addendum B. 
At the entrance to the northwest bedroom, Beltran's room, a sheet of plywood was 
angled up from the 2 x 4 boards on the floor to the dresser in the middle of the room (T 495: 
418-19,431,461; T 497: 1103). The dresser drawers were stacked around and on top of the 
dresser under a large "perfect square" cut-out hole in the ceiling, which exposed the wood 
flooring above (T 495: 284, 371, 420, 459-60). See Addendum B. Again, the cut-out 
Sheetrock was not in the room (T 495: 284, 322, 324). Accelerant had been poured on 
Beltran's dresser (T 495: 336,454-55; T 496: 687-89). Inside one drawer was a receipt for 
five gallons of kerosene purchased eight days previously (T 495: 341-43, 462-63).10 
In the basement's storage room, large paper-wrapped bundles of napkins were placed 
twelve inches apart along the top shelf (T 495: 282, 308, 458-59). See Addendum B. 
9
 Boards soaked with accelerant are called "trailers" and are used to spread the fire 
from one location to another (T 495: 456; T 496: 656-57). See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 
123, 125 (Utah 1986) (noting use of "trailers" in intentional fires). 
10
 Carpenter did not purchase or store kerosene at the restaurant (T 496: 574). 
Beltran claimed he purchased it to clean tar marks off Carpenter's motor home and clean 
the vehicle's carburetor (T 497: 1049-55). He put the remainder of the five gallons into a 
container in the shed and another in the motor home (T 497: 1056-59, 1120-21). 
Chemical companies label the same chemical petroleum distillate under different 
product-use names (e.g. kerosene, paint thinner, lighter fuel) (T 496: 688). This occurred 
here: the "kerosene" purchased was not true kerosene, but a mixture of aromatic and 
medium petroleum distillate (T 496: 688-691). The solvent in the basement was a similar 
mixture of aromatic and medium petroleum distillate (T 495: 512-20; T 496: 687-89). 
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Between the shelves, a 5 x 2 Vi foot section of Sheetrock ceiling was cut out, exposing the 
underside of the wooden flooring above (T 495: 283,485-59). Again, the cut-out Sheetrock 
was not in the room (T 495: 283, 324). Next to the storage room was a small room where 
the restaurant's business records were normally stored; the room was empty except for 
accelerant-soaked newspapers in the closet (T 495: 283, 519-20; T 497: 1104, 1106).11 
Under the basement stairs near the apartment's kitchen, a 3 x 4 foot section of Sheetrock was 
cut out and removed from the room (T 495: 285-86, 464-65; T 496: 884). 
Numerous personal items appeared to have been removed from the basement and 
restaurant (T 495:420-21; T 496: 623-25,627). The basement rooms were "very bare" and 
pictures appeared to have been removed from the walls, leaving only bare nails (T 495:420-
21; T 496: 623-25,627). Empty clothes hangers and minimal clothing were in the bedroom 
closets {id. & Exhibits 11& 13). Pictures of Carpenter's daughter had been removed from 
their normal location on the mantle of the restaurant's fireplace (T 496:644-48,805-10,848-
49). Beltran's truck, which was normally parked next to the southwest corner of the 
restaurant, the comer where the fire was first observed, was parked in an "unusual spot," very 
close to the road (T 494: 223-28; T 495: 318). A small piece of painted pink and white 
1!
 Beltran claimed that prior to the fire, Carpenter's business records were moved 
to the shed because the apartment had flooded (T 497: 1104-06). Two days before the 
fire, Carpenter gave him a couple of bags of documents and "stuff to put in her motor 
home (T 497: 1065). He claimed he did not know if the documents were the restaurant's 
business records (T 497: 1065, 1106). 
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Sheetrock was lodged in the bed of the truck (T 495: 334-35, 352). It was identical to the 
missing sections of ceiling (T 495: 336-38).I2 See Exhibits 3 & 25. 
Ultimately, the attic access was "completely ablaze" "like a fire ball" (T 495: 416, 
423). The attic and roof were "petty well destroyed" (T 495: 294). The interior of a wall in 
the main floor bathroom was damaged (T 495: 485-86,490-95). Burning debris fell on the 
basement stairs, but the fire never reached the basement (T 495: 426, 490). 
Both parties' experts agreed that the fire started near the attic access in the ceiling of 
the restaurant (T 495: 503-04; T 497: 1149-54; T 499: 145, 162). The State's expert 
concluded that accelerant was used and that the fire was intentionally set (T 496: 501, 581, 
665, 667). He could not determine, however, what precise means was used to ignite the 
blaze, i.e.,. "match, cigarette lighter, or what" (T 496:616). Defendants' experts opined that 
an electrical short accidentally caused the fire (T 497: 1204; T 499: 145-52,162). But their 
electrical expert admitted that the wires could have been intentionally manipulated to cause 
an electrical short to ignite the fire (T 498: 1221-22). 
The State's expert, Lynn Borg, a former Utah State Fire Marshal and now the State's 
senior arson investigator, was at the restaurant by 11:00 a.m., only a few hours after the fire 
was extinguished (T 495: 436-39, 451). Armed with a search warrant, Borg physically 
examined all parts of the building and used a bucket truck to "crawl" through the unstable 
12
 Other than this piece, none of the missing Sheetrock was found (T 495: 276, 
285, 322, 324; T 497: 923-24). Defendants denied using the truck to transport Sheetrock 
(T 496: 573; T 497: 1108). Two days before the fire, an extra dumpster pick-up was 
arranged, which the garbage man thought was "unusual" because it was the slow season 
and he had already made the normal monthly pickup (T 494: 194-97). 
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attic and hand-inspect the electrical wiring (T 495: 440: T 496: 593-598, 638-41). He also 
used a hydrocarbon detector to determine if accelerant vapors were present (T 495:441 -49). 
At the top of the basement stairs, Borg noticed the same strong smell of paint thinner, 
or possibly kerosene, that Alldredge had earlier (T 495: 446-47, 620-21). As he went down 
the stairs, the hydrocarbon detector went to "LEL" indicating an "explosive limit," and an 
audio alarm sounded (T 495: 448, 621). There were "so many vapors in that atmosphere 
there that [the detector] wouldn't even measure them.. . . The numerical measuring of the 
hydrocarbon detector went clear off the scale. It wouldn't even measure how much . . . 
flammable gas there was in the environment" (T 495:448-49). The smell became nauseating 
(T 494: 450, 621). In the basement, Borg observed the same arson preparations that 
Alldredge and his firefighters had (T 495: 451-68).13 Borg also examined the building's 
electrical panel, but found no evidence of burning or damage (T 495:469-89; T 496:638-43). 
During his hands-on examination of the attic and roof, Borg found extensive evidence 
of carbonization (T 495: 481-86).14 2 x 4 inch planks stacked around the attic access were 
equally burned, a sign that accelerant was used (T 496: 586-87). The surrounding wood was 
"totally burned or totally carbonized to where it's to a point where you can just break it into 
small particles indicating that you have had a lot of heat on that to totally carbonize that 
13
 Defendants' arson expert refused to consider the presence of accelerant and the 
arson preparations in the basement because the fire was in the attic (T 499: 154). Their 
electrical expert was unaware of the preparations in the basement, but similarly opined 
that such evidence was irrelevant to his opinion (T 498: 1219-20, 1229-30). 
14
 A high degree of carbonization indicates accelerant because flammable liquids 
burn three times more BTU's then wood alone and, consequently, "totally carbonize 
[wood] quickly" (T 495: 495-96). 
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wood" (T 495: 483). The fire burned a large 15x4 foot hole in the center of the roof and a 
smaller hole in the southwest corner (T 495: 486-88). See Addendum B. 
Fire normally bums up and out in a V-pattern (T 495: 501-03). It does not bum on 
a horizontal plane unless an accelerant is used (id.). Here, Borg found "unusual... extensive 
low burning, horizontal burning right above the ceiling, out across that ceiling and around 
the attic access hole" (T 495: 501 & 502). Such burning could not occur without "some type 
of flammable liquid... being poured on that floor to cause it to bum across the [attic] floor 
in that manner" (T 495:503). Oxygen from ventilation vents drew the fire into the southwest 
comer of the attic, the area where the flames were first observed on the roof (T 494: 505). 
Despite the physical evidence that an accelerant was used, Borg's hydrocarbon detector did 
not register the presence of accelerant in the attic (T 495: 508-09). Borg was not surprised. 
Whereas accelerant in the basement was unbumed, any accelerant in the attic was quicky 
vaporized and "consumed" by the intensity of the fire (T 495: 510). 
Borg discovered a large concave hole burnt in the south wall of the main floor 
bathroom just below the attic access (T 495: 485-86, 490). Inside the wall, the wood was 
extensively charred and the structural support "totally burned" (T 495: 490, 493). See 
Addendum B. The bum pattern was V-shaped, but started about four or five feet above the 
floor (T 495:490-95). Borg concluded that accelerant poured on the attic floor seeped down 
and caused the charring and carbonization midway in the bathroom wall (T 495: 490-98). 
Two weeks before the fire, defendants announced they were planning a trip to Arizona 
(T 494: 220-21). Around the same time, they fired their only waiter/dishwasher (T 497: 846 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
& 858). A few days later, on March 16, Beltran drove to Hurricane, Utah, and purchased 
five gallons of kerosene (T 497: 1055). 
Defendants claimed they left for Prescott, Arizona in Carpenter's 35-foot motor home 
on Sunday, March 22, two days before the fire (T 496: 570;T497: 1061-62).15 They claimed 
not to have returned to Kanab until Tuesday, March 24, hours after the fire (T 497: 1094). 
However, a local nurse, who was familiar with the motor home, saw it in the restaurant's 
parking lot on Monday, March 23, around noon (T 496: 751, 754-57). The bottom 
compartments were open as if it were being loaded (T 496: 752). 
According to defendants, they never reached Prescott because the motor home 
experienced mechanical problems around Sedona, Arizona and they were forced to return 
to Kanab (T 496: 1071-94). Carpenter told an investigator that they drove to Sedona via 
Page, Arizona (Highway 89) and returned by the same route (T 496: 716-17). Beltran 
testified they traveled via Fredonia and Marble Canyon, Arizona (Alternate Route 89) and 
returned by the same route (T 496: 718-19, 794; T 497: 1071-94). Carpenter claimed she 
took lots of pictures with her camera in Sedona (T 496: 720). Beltran said they took no 
pictures because Carpenter left her camera at home (id.). 
Beltran insisted that when they left Kanab, the building was locked, the attic access 
cover was in place, the drawers were in the dressers, no holes were in the ceilings, and no 
boards lined the hallway (T 497: 1066-70). He also insisted that the kerosene he purchased 
was in containers in the shed and in the motor home (T 497: 1055-59, 1068, 1120-21). 
15
 The restaurant was normally closed on Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays (T 
497: 851). March 22 was also the day of the extra dumpster pickup (T 494: 197). 
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Beltran denied they removed personal items from the building, except for those 
necessary for their trip (T 497: 1064). Yet, defendants took Carpenter's photo albums, a 
couple bags of documents and "stuff," and the insurance policy for the building (T 496: 575; 
T 497: 1065). On March 24, when defendants returned to the Frontier, Carpenter had the 
insurance policy in her purse (T 496: 575). And before they were allowed back into the 
building, Carpenter volunteered: 
Carpenter. Clothes are all - or, clothes are out of all of those drawers that are 
gone. I don't know why anybody would want to take somebody's clothes. 
Insurance Adjuster: You are saying the clothes are gone? 
Carpenter: Uh-huh . . . And some of the clothes in the closet. 
(T 496: 722-25). 
Carpenter ran the restaurant for about two years prior to the fire, first, under a lease 
and later, in 1997, as the owner (T 497: 1013,1021). When she purchased the building, its 
exterior and grounds were "shabby" and the restaurant's kitchen and basement living quarters 
were in need of repairs (id.). Carpenter invested a "lot of money" in the property, but the 
improvements were still not complete (T 497: 1015-16, 1021; T 499: 17). From March to 
December 1997, Carpenter deposited gross receipts of $124,000.00 in the restaurant's bank 
account (T 499: 13). Profits, however, were seasonal: October through March/April were 
slow months, with business picking up in the summer (T 494: 313; T 497: 1022-23). By the 
fall of 1997, Carpenter told a contractor she hired to build an addition to the restaurant that 
she was experiencing "funding problems" (T 494: 191). The contractor stopped work on the 
addition (T 494: 190-91). Defendants tried to finish the work themselves, but the result 
violated the building code (T 496: 783). In March 1998, the city inspector cited Carpenter 
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for the code violation and told her that either a professional architect needed to rebuild the 
addition or the new structure would have to be torn down (T 496: 779-84; T 496: 822-833). 
The cost of rebuilding was $12,000.00 (T 499: 8-9). 
Carpenter concealed these facts from the investigating officers. When questioned by 
Borg on March 25, the day after the fire, Carpenter insisted that the patio addition was 
professionally built (T 496: 572). Even though she previously had admitted to the city 
inspector that she and Beltran had worked on the addition, she now told Borg that Beltran 
had not worked on the patio because he was physically incapable of that type of labor (T 496: 
573). And despite the formal citation a week or so before, Carpenter told Borg that the 
building inspector had "no problem" with the addition and she was in full compliance with 
the building code (T 496: 572). 
Carpenter told Borg she purchased her motor home in Arizona a year before the fire 
(T 496: 574). Beltran admitted that she purchased the motor home in St. George, Utah, in 
February 1998, the month before the fire, and only took possession in early March, a few 
weeks before the fire (T497: 1033-37,1045; T 499: 36-38). Carpenter paid $10,000 down 
on the vehicle about two weeks before receiving her citation and learning of the $12,000 
repair (T 496: 779-80, 825; T 499: 36-38). 
The market value of the restaurant without the completed improvements was about 
$220,000, less the cost of the immediate $12,000 repair, or about $ 208,000 (T 499: 8-9,17-
18). If put on the market, the commercial property would take up to a year to sell (T 498: 
19-20). The insurance value on the building was $250,000, with an additional $85,000 for 
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personal items (T 495:433-35). The prosecutor argued that Carpenter would gain more from 
her insurance than from a sale (T 500: 11-12, 20-21, 22, 62). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The merits of defendants' appeal should not be considered because defendants have < 
failed to properly brief the issues or marshal the evidence. All of defendants' issues are fact-
dependent, yet they have not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings or 
the jury verdict. Nor have defendants engaged in proper legal analysis. Based on 
defendants' procedural failures, their convictions should be summarily affirmed. Even if the 
merits of the appeal are considered, affirmance is still appropriate. ' 
Validity of Search Warrant: The trial court properly admitted two items seized in 
plain view. It correctly ruled that fourteen other items were seized pursuant to a search 
warrant issued by an authorized magistrate which, when read with its accompanying 
affidavit, particularly described the items to be seized. The court then individually reviewed 
the fourteen items and concluded that seven of them should be suppressed because they were 
beyond the scope of the warrant, but the other remaining seven items were validly seized 
and, therefore, admissible. The ruling is correct. "
 { 
But even if admission of the items were erroneous as claimed by defendant, any error 
would be harmless. Firemen, lawfully in the building, observed the same items prior to their 
subsequent challenged seizure. Because the firemen testified to their observations, the 
admission of the physical objects was merely cumulative of their testimony. 
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Plain Error in Voir Dire: Below, defendants conceded that the jury voir dire was fair 
and complete. They also waived any for-cause challenges to the four jurors in question and 
failed to use available peremptory challenges to remove them. Consequently, defendants' 
plain error argument necessarily fails because their actions invited any alleged error. 
Defendants challenged Juror Jones' residency in a motion for new trial. The motion 
was properly denied because the evidence established that Jones was a Utah resident even 
though he worked in Arizona. Consequently, no plain error occurred. 
Motion for New Trial Based on Alleged Juror Misconduct: Defendants moved for 
a new trial on the ground that jurors improperly conversed with the prosecutor's wife's 
during trial. The record establishes that one juror may have engaged in a brief common 
courtesy exchange with the prosecutor's wife at a drinking fountain. A second juror 
approached the wife in the hall to inform her of their mutual involvement in an upcoming 
community musical. The two did not discuss the trial or the parties. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that these minimal contacts did not justify a new trial. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence: The experts disagreed on whether the fire was 
accidentally or intentionally set. This disagreement provides no basis for reversing the 
verdicts. The jury was entitled to accept one opinion over the other or reject both and rely 
on their own evaluation of the evidence. 
Moreover, the exact manner in which the fire was ignited is not determinative where, 
as here, the evidence supports that the fire was intentional. Even defendants' electrical 
expert admitted that the electrical short which he believed ignited the fire could have been 
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intentionally manipulated. And their arson expert conceded that it would be rare to have an 
accidental electrical fire ignite part of a building at the same time that another part of the 
building was fully prepared for arson. Given the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonably 
concluded that defendants aided and abetted each other in setting a fire to intentionally 
damage the building. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
The trial court ruled that a search warrant executed on March 24, the day of the fire, 
was issued by an authorized magistrate and, when read with its accompanying affidavit, 
sufficiently described the items to be seized (BR 167-175; CR 275-77,295-303; T 492:145, 
157-58, 178-82; T 501: 35-38, 46-64). The court also found that some items were exempt 
from the warrant requirement because they were in plain view from a position in the parking 
lot or seen by the firemen when they were legitimately in the premises pursuant to the 
exigency of the fire (id.). Consequently, the court denied defendants' motions to suppress 
nine items (id). At the same time, the court suppressed seven other items which either did 
not constitute "evidence of arson" or were seized during an unauthorized re-entry on March 
25 (id.). See Addendum C (Search Warrant/Affidavit; Rulings on Motion to Suppress). 
In Issue I of their brief, defendants present six challenges (Points I-VI) to the trial 
court's ruling, which can be summarized as follows: 
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Point /: the warrant lacks particularity in its description of the items to be 
seized and a coffee cup, two pairs of Nike shoes, and a yellow flashlight (Items 
1 -4) should be suppressed because they do not constitute "evidence of arson"; 
Point II: the warrant's lack of particularity results in its being a general 
warrant and any items seized should be suppressed; 
Point III: the firemen could not permissibly enter the basement because the fire 
was in the attic and the smell of solvent cannot justify the intrusion; 
Point IV: the officers made an unauthorized re-entry on March 25 and seized 
a cardboard sample, a purse, and two photographs (Items 8-10) which should 
be suppressed; 
Point V: the magistrate, as a non-lawyer justice of the peace, could only issue 
a warrant for property in the Orderville precinct and, therefore, the warrant for 
property in Kanab is invalid; 
Point VI: the samples seized should be suppressed because they were 
contaminated and their chain-of-custody compromised. 
{Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.J at 9-23). None of these challenges, however, should be 
considered because defendants have failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings or ruling. Moreover, Points II & IV-VI are not properly briefed. 
Alternatively, even if the briefing defects are overlooked, Points I and IV are moot and Point 
IV is not preserved. Consequently, only the merits of Points II, III & V should be 
considered. But even if considered, the trial court correctly rejected these claims. 
Consequently, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, the challenges fail. 
(A) The Merits of the Suppression Order Should Not Be Considered 
Because Defendants Fail to Marshal the Facts in Support of the Ruling. 
A trial court's factual findings underlying a denial of a motion to suppress are entitled 
to deference and may be rejected on appeal only if clearly erroneous. State v. Fridleifson, 
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2002 UT App 322, % 7,57 P.3d 1098. Morever, even though a trial court's legal conclusions 
are subject to de novo review, the fact-dependent nature of Fourth Amendment inquiries 
demand that a "measure of discretion [be accorded] to the trial judge's application of the 
legal standard to the facts." Id. An appellant wishing to attack a denial of a suppression 
motion must do more than "merely mak[e] the pertinent excerpts from the record readily 
available to a reviewing court." Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724. 
Instead, he or she must "marshal aU of the evidence that arguably supports" the trial court 
ruling and, after gathering "every scrap" of evidence, become a "devil's advocate" by 
"temporarily removing] its own prejudices and fully embracing] the adversary's position." 
Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, f 19,57 P.3d 1093 (citing Neely, id.) (emphasis in original). 
See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (imposing marshaling requirement on all appellants). Here, 
defendants fail to meet this requirement. 
The most glaring marshaling defect is defendants' failure to acknowledge that the trial 
court granted in part their motions to suppress. In Point I, defendants argue that a coffee 
mug, Nike shoes, and a flashlight were not authorized to be seized because they did not 
constitute "evidence of arson" {Br.Aplt. at 10). But defendants fail to acknowledge that the 
trial court agreed and suppressed these items (BR 169; CR 297). Defendants' failure to 
marshal this fact contravenes the requirements of rule 24(a) and results in the needless 
presentation of a moot issue on appeal. Consequently, the State will only address 
defendants' particularity argument in the context of defendants' Point II, that is, in relation 
to items which were not suppressed. See Subsection 1(C), infra. 
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Similarly, in Points I and IV, defendants claim that an unauthorized re-entry was made 
the day after the search warrant was executed (Br.Aplt. at 12-13, 17-18). Again, defendants 
fail to acknowledge that the trial court agreed that a re-entry was made on March 25 and 
suppressed all items seized as a result of that re-entry, specifically, a cardboard sample, a 
purse, and two photographs (BR 169; CR 297). This issue, therefore, is moot and the State 
will not address it. 
In Point II, defendants assert that the search warrant's alleged lack of particularity 
transformed it into a general warrant (Br.Aplt. at 14-16). Again, defendants have failed to 
marshal or even acknowledge salient facts: Fire Chief Alldredge, the affiant, executed the 
warrant with Chief Arson Investigator Borg (BR 170; CR 298). This critical finding - that 
the affiant executed the warrant - underlies the court's legal determination that "because the 
search warrant was executed by the signer of the affidavit... the lack of specificity in the 
search warrant may be bolstered by the specificity in the affidavit" (BR 168; CR 296). The 
fact that two trained fire investigators oversaw the search also underlies the court's 
determination that, based on their training, the persons executing the warrant reasonably 
understood what the magistrate intended by the term "evidence of arson" (id.). 
Moreover, in challenging the warrant, defendants fail to acknowledge the trial court's 
finding that two of the items seized were in plain view from the restaurant's parking lot. The 
trial court found that the small piece of Sheetrock was in open view when an officer, standing 
in the parking lot, observed it in the bed of Beltran's truck (BR 167; CR 295; T 501:48-49). 
The trial court likewise found that the photographs and video of the fire damage to the roof 
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and attic were taken by firemen looking down on the building from a bucket truck 
legitimately in the parking lot (BR 167; CR 295; T 501: 50, 52-53, 55-58). Defendants do 
not attack these findings; they simply ignore them. 
Similarly, in Points III, V, and VI, defendants ignore relevant factual findings 
underlying the court's legal conclusions that the initial entries were lawful, that the 
magistrate was authorized to issue the warrant, and that any alleged contamination of the 
seized items went to their foundational, not constitutional, admissibility (Addendum Q. 
In sum, defendants' failures to marshal justify summary rejection of Issue I in its 
entirety. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 17, & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (recognizing that an 
appellate court may summarily refuse to consider the merits when an appellant has failed to 
properly marshal). Alternatively, Points I and IV are moot. 
(B) The Merits of the Suppression Ruling Should Not Be Considered 
Because Defendants9 Arguments Are Not Preserved and Improperly Briefed. 
This Court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (reaffirming general mle). Nor will it consider 
issues which have not been properly briefed. State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, fflf 8-13, 
47 P.3d 107 (discussing specific requirements of rule 24(a)). 
In Point VI, defendants assert that the seized items containing accelerant should have 
been suppressed because they were contaminated in the course of their seizure (Br.Aplt. at 
22-23). However, when raised below, the trial court ruled that chain-of-custody issues were 
not properly included within a Fourth Amendment challenge, but could be part of a 
evidentiary foundational challenge at trial (T 492: 182). Defense counsel agreed and stated 
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that if defendants decided to pursue the issue, they would file a new motion (T 492: 183). 
They did not. And when the various items were introduced at trial, defendants raised no 
objections to their admission on foundational grounds.16 Consequently, defendants have 
waived consideration of Point VI and may not raise it for the first time on appeal. 
Additionally, defendants have failed to properly brief Points II & IV-VI. In Point II, 
they set forth the facts of a federal circuit court case, but then, without any analysis of the 
facts in this case, summarily assert that the search warrant here is a prohibited general 
warrant (Br.Aplt. at 14-15). Point IV is completely devoid of legal analysis {Br.Aplt. at 17-
18), and, in any case, is moot. See Subsection 1(A), supra. In Point V, defendants claim that 
a non-lawyer justice of the peace may not issue a search warrant, but cite no supporting 
authority and ignore statutory law to the contrary {Br.Aplt. at 18-21). See Subsection 1(E), 
infra. Point VI {Br.Aplt. at 22-23) contains no authority and, in any case, is not preserved 
and waived. See discussion, above. 
In sum, defendants' inadequate briefing precludes consideration of the merits of 
Points II & IV-VI. Alternatively, even if properly briefed, Point VI is not preserved. 
(C) The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Warrant, When Read with its 
Accompanying Affidavit, Sufficiently Described the Items to Be Seized. 
Defendant claims that Items 5-7 and 11-15, plus photographs and a video of the fire 
damage, must be suppressed because the search warrant's alleged lack of particularity 
rendered it a general warrant {Br.Aplt. at 14-16). The claim lacks merit. 
16
 Defendants objected on relevancy grounds, claiming that whatever was found in 
the basement was irrelevant because the fire was in the attic (T 494: 252-260). The trial 
court overruled the objection (T 494: 260). 
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The trial court admitted Item 5 (the Sheetrock in Beltran's truck) and the photographs 
and video under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement (Addendum Q. This 
exception permits the seizure of "objects falling within the plain view of an officer from a 
position where he is entitled to be. . . . For an officer to look at what is in open view from 
a position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy." State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). Here, a Highway Patrol pilot, who transported Borg to the scene, 
observed the quarter-sized piece of painted Sheetrock in the open bed of Beltran's truck 
parked next to the road in the restaurant's parking lot (BR 169; CR 297; T 492: 165-66; T 
501: 48-49). Similarly, a bucket fire truck in the parking lot to fight the fire was used by 
Alldredge and others to look down on the collapsed roof and exposed attic of the restaurant 
and take pictures and a video of the damage (BR 169; CR 297; T 492:65-66; T 501: 50-53). 
Defendants have not properly attacked these findings on appeal. See Subsection 1(A), supra. 
In any case, the evidence supports the factual findings which, in turn, support the court's 
legal conclusion that the Sheetrock, photographs, and video were all admissible. 
The trial court admitted the remaining seven items (Items 6-7 & 11-15) pursuant to 
the search warrant, which the court concluded sufficiently described the items to be seized 
(BR 167-68, 173-75; CR 295-296, 302-03). See Addendum C. This ruling is correct. 
The Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant to describe with "particularity" the 
items to be seized, but the "adequacy of a description in a search warrant depends in every 
instance upon the particular facts of the case." State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 
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(Utah 1985). "Without substantial justification, warrants describing property only in generic 
terms (terms applicable to an entire class of property) are not favored by the law. However, 
use of such descriptions have been allowed when a more specific description of the things 
to be seized is unavailable." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). In other 
words, while the description must be "'such that the officer with a search warrant can with 
reasonable effort ascertain and identify'" the item or place to be searched, Anderson, 701 
P.2d at 1102 (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)) (emphasis in 
original), "the specificity required is flexible and will vary with the circumstances and the 
type of items involved." United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942,948 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 
479 U.S. 937 (1986). Accord State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, UK 21-22,48 P.3d 872 (holding 
that an "all records" warrant is constitutional where the business to be searched is "permeated 
with fraud"), cert denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); Gallegos,l\2 P.2d at 209-10 (recognizing 
that more generalized descriptions are permissible in drug cases and the like "where the 
inherent nature of the property sought... precludes specific description" or "where attendant 
circumstances prevented a detailed description from being given"). 
While the question of particularity is a legal one, its determination is practical. See 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102 (recognizing fact-dependent nature of legal inquiry); United 
States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying "practical" test). 
[I]f the purpose of a search is to find a specific item of property, it should be 
described in the warrant with sufficient particularity to preclude an officer 
from seizing the wrong property. On the other hand, if the purpose of a search 
is to seize any property of a specified character, a particularized description is 
unnecessary and often impossible. 
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State v. Withers, 504 P.2d 1151,1154 (Wash. App. 1972). The latter situation applies to fire 
investigations. Even when arson is reasonably suspected, the specific cause of a fire is 
generally unknown prior to a complete search of the premises. Moreover, the range of 
possible causes is broad and may be masked or even obliterated by the fire damage. 
Consequently, courts approve of more generalized descriptions when fires are involved. See, 
e.g., Finnigin, 113 F.3d at 1186-87 (concluding that a warrant to search a burned trailer was 
sufficiently particular where it described the items to be seized as any "unlawful explosives, 
components or materials" and "any equipment capable of use for the manufacture or 
assembly of said unlawful explosive devices"); Withers, 504 P.2d at 126-27 (holding that a 
search warrant for a fire-damaged ship suspected of carrying stolen cargo was sufficiently 
specific when it authorized seizure of "merchandise from disabled ship Don Jose" because 
time concerns and the fire prevented any more specific description). 
Additionally, in determining if a warrant meets constitutional specificity, the warrant 
may be read with its accompanying affidavit to determine what was "contemplated by the 
magistrate authorizing the warrant." Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1103. Accord State v. South, 
932 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah App.) (recognizing that under Utah law, the affidavit may be 
considered when the warrant specifically refers to it), cert, denied, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 
1997); State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that a warrant 
may be read with its "accompanying" affidavit). Here, the warrant is based on "[pjroof by 
affidavit under oath having been made this day before [the magistrate] by Alan Alldredge" 
(Addendum Q. Additionally, the trial court found that Alldredge signed the affidavit, 
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executed the search warrant, and was present throughout the search (BR 170; CR 298, T 501: 
59-60). Consequently, the court correctly ruled that the warrant and affidavit could be read 
together (BR 168; CR 296; T 501: 59). 
Defendants not only ignore the trial court's ruling, they fail to recognize the authority 
upon which it is justifiably predicated. Instead, defendants improperly focus on the warrant 
alone. The warrant authorized the seizure of "any item o r . . . evidence of arson of reckless 
burning, possessed or left by a party to the illegal conduct" (Addendum Q. This language, 
though broad, is constitutionally sufficient when read in the context of the affidavit (T 501 : 
12-14,35-38). 
Alldredge's affidavit described the building to be searched as the Frontier Restaurant, 
consisting of the restaurant and the basement apartment occupied by defendants (Addendum 
C). The affidavit described the fire damage to the roof and southwest portion of the building 
and the smoke damage throughout the building (id). It described the stacked dressers in the 
basement, the cut-out portions of the Sheetrock ceiling, and the napkins stacked in the 
storage room (id.). It specifically noted that the cut-out Sheetrock has not been located (id.). 
It then described the strong smell of a paint thinner-like solvent throughout the basement and 
especially in the storage area (id.). The affidavit stated that defendants were reportedly out-
of-town, but there were no signs of forced entry (id.). 
The trial court correctly concluded that in light of the affidavit, the warrant's 
authorization to seize "evidence of arson or reckless burning" on the Frontier premises was 
sufficiently descriptive to guide the fire chief and senior arson investigator who were 
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executing the warrant (BR 168; CR 296; T 501: 35-38). The court reasonably refused to 
suppress seized items which were clearly connected with the suspected arson described in 
the affidavit. These items included: basement drywall, accelerant-soaked newspaper from 
the middle room, accelerant-soaked clothing from the dressers, a receipt for kerosene found 
in one dresser, and a container of flammable liquid and a can of paint thinner in the shed (BR 
169; CR 297). Given the attendant circumstances of the investigation, the warrant fully 
comports with the Fourth Amendment. See Norris, 2001 UT 104, ff 21-22; Gallegos, 712 
P.2d at 209-10 (both recognizing permissibility of more generalized descriptions dependent 
upon the facts of the individual investigation). 
(D) The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Initial Warrantless Entry into 
the Basement Was Justified. 
Defendant contends that the firemen could not enter the basement because the fire was 
located in the attic and the smell of solvent in the basement did not provide probable cause 
for its search {Br.Aplt at 16-17). The claim lacks support. 
The trial court found that from 4:00 a.m. to approximately 7:00 a.m., the burning fire 
created an exigency which justified the firefighters' warrantless entry into the building (T 
501: 50-51). See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that "a burning 
building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 
reasonable"). The court refused to distinguish between the restaurant and basement because 
both areas were equally exposed to the fire if the attic or roof collapsed; moreover, people 
could still be in the basement (T 501: 52-43). It was during this exigent period that Fire 
Chief Alldredge smelled solvent and he and his men observed the arson preparations in the 
;
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basement (T 501: 51). The court ruled that the firemen's entries were justified and 
Alldredge's photographs of what was in plain view permissible (T 501: 52-54). See Tyler, 
id. (recognizing that firemen may seize "evidence of arson that is in plain view"). The ruling 
is correct. See id. at 510 (holding that officials may "remain in a building for a reasonable 
time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished . . . and the warrantless 
seizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these purposes also is constitutional"). 
The trial court also correctly ruled that after the fire was extinguished and the 
exigency ended, further investigation required a warrant (T 501: 54-55). See Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,293, reh 'g. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 (1984) (requiring a search warrant 
for "additional investigations begun after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police 
officials [leave] the scene"). The warrant was properly based on the plain view observations 
of Alldredge and his men during the initial warrantless investigation (T 501: 51). The 
warrant properly also included Alldredge's detection of solvent in the basement (T 492: 
145). Though defendants assert that smell cannot form the basis of a probable cause 
determination (Br.Aplt. at 17), their cited authority contradicts them: 
If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the 
affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to 
identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis 
insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well 
be found to be evidence of most persuasive character. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). Accord State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 
972 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding a search of a vehicle on plain smell alone). Accordingly, 
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the trial court correctly concluded that the observations of Alldredge and his fire fighters 
were a legitimate predicate for the warrant (T 501: 50-53). 
(E) The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Search Warrant Was 
Issued by an Authorized Magistrate. 
Defendants argue that the justice of the peace who issued the search warrant was not 
legally authorized to do so because he was not a lawyer and he acted outside his jurisdiction 
{Br.Aplt. 18-21). The argument has no merit. 
Below, defendants admitted that Justice Hoyt could legally perform all magisterial 
functions in the justice courts of Orderville, but asserted that as a non-lawyer, he could not 
be appointed pro tern magistrate for purposes of conducting a preliminary hearing in the 
district court in Kanab (T 492:130-39,173). The trial court found that Justice Hoyt was duly 
authorized to conduct the preliminary hearing and denied defendants' motion to quash the 
bindover (T 492: 157,177-78). On appeal, defendants do not challenge the bindover order, 
nor could they: their convictions render the issue moot. See State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 
!7n.l,34P.3d767. 
Below, defendants did not challenge Justice Hoyfs authority to issue a search warrant 
for property located in Orderville, but like their bindover argument, claimed he could not 
issue a warrant for property in Kanab (T 492: 139). Now, for the first time on appeal and 
without any supporting authority, defendants claim that a non-lawyer justice of the peace 
may never issue a search warrant {Br.Aplt. at 20-21). Because defendants' failed to preserve 
this argument and failed to properly brief it, this Court should summarily reject it. See cases 
cited, Subsection 1(B), supra. If the Court considers the issue, it is without merit. 
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Defendants are correct that issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial function. 
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,302-03 (Utah 1998) (holding that a search warrant is an 
enforceable order and, therefore, its issuance is a core judicial function). But non-lawyer 
judges may lawfully perform judicial functions. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § § 1, 5, & 11 
(authorizing legislative establishment of "courts not of record" and prohibiting any 
requirement that judges of such courts be admitted to the practice of law). See also UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-5-101 (2002) (establishing justice courts as "courts not of record"). 
Here, the court found that Justice Hoyt was "duly-appointed" (T 492: 157). 
Defendants' only challenge to that determination is to attack his pro tern appointment in 
Kanab {Br.Aplt. at 19-20). But Justice Hoyt's pro tern status only relates to the preliminary 
hearing, it has no bearing on his authority to issue a search warrant because a justice of the 
peace may issue a warrant to search any location within the judicial district. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-7-17.5(2)(c) (2002) (limiting a justice's authority to issue a search warrant to 
those locations "within the judicial district"). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(4) (1999) 
(designating a justice as a "magistrate"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-201(2) (1999) 
(permitting magistrates to issue search warrants); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-106 (2002) 
(same). Consequently, Justice Hoyt, as a justice within the Sixth Judicial District, was 
authorized to issue a search warrant for property located in Kanab, a city within that district. 
(F) Alternatively, Even if Error Occurred, the Error is Harmless Because 
Admission of the Seized Items Was Cumulative of Other Testimony. 
The trial court found that even if the search warrant were defective, the searching 
officers relied on it in good faith and, therefore, suppression of items seized pursuant to it 
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would not be justified (BR 167;CR295;T501: 60). Generally, however, good faith cannot 
justify reliance on a warrant which is facially defective due to lack of particularity. See 
UnitedStates v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
Assuming arguendo that the warrant were found to be defective and Leon found to 
be inapplicable, any error would still be harmless. Admission of Items 6-7 & 11-15 was 
cumulative of Chief Alldredge's and the other firefighters' testimony.17 As the trial court 
found, Alldredge and the other firemen fully observed the arson preparations in the basement, 
including the solvent, during the initial exigency period in which no warrant was required 
(T 501: 50-53). They testified to these observations at trial. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Consequently, even if the admission of the physical objects were error, no prejudice resulted. 
See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923-924 (Utah App. 1995) (concluding that no 
prejudice resulted from the admission of illegally seized physical objects where the officer 
testified to his lawful observations of the same objects). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
PLAINLY ERRED IN THE JURY VOIR DIRE 
Defendants claim that the court plainly erred in questioning Jurors Scott Johnson, 
Wendy Harris, and Blane Harris about their relationship to each other and their relatives' 
government employment (Br.Aplt. at 23-32). They also claim the court plainly erred in not 
17
 The admissibility of the Sheetrock chip, photographs, and video was not 
dependent on the validity of the warrant. See Subsection 1(C). 
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exploring Juror Justin Jones's residency and, because Jones is allegedly not a Utah resident, 
a new trial should be granted (Br.Aplt. at 26-27). The claims have no merit. 
(A) The Voir Dire Should Not Be Reviewed Because Defendants Fail to Cite 
Relevant Facts and Controlling Case Law. 
Defendants do not fairly present the voir dire. They focus on isolated questions posed 
to the four jurors, without presenting all the questions asked of these jurors or the related 
questions asked of the panel as a whole. Compare Defendant fs Facts at 24-27, with State's 
Voir Dire Excerpts (Addendum D). Additionally, defendants fail to fully acknowledge the 
waivers and stipulations of their counsel. See Subsection 11(B), infra. Nevertheless, 
defendants claim that the trial court plainly erred. An appellant cannot claim that a court 
committed obvious prejudicial error without first presenting all relevant facts. Cf. Lucero, 
2002 UT App 135, % 9 (noting rule 24's requirement to fairly set out facts pertinent to an 
argument). Consequently, this Court should decline to consider the merits of their claim. 
Cf. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17, & n.2 (refusing to consider merits of an unmarshaled claim). 
Defendants' failure to fully present the relevant facts leads to other briefing failures. 
Defendants' legal analysis is six pages of verbatim quotations from State v. Woolley, 810 
P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (Br.Aplt. at 27-32). This does 
not met the requirements of rule 24(a). See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, f 11 (recognizing 
rule 24's requirement of meaningful analysis of legal authority). Moreover, Woolley does 
not control where counsel strategically chose not to object to the jurors in question. 
Woolley recognizes a trial court's discretion in conducting voir dire, but holds that 
"[o]nce a juror's impartiality has been put in doubt, a trial judge must investigate by further 
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questions to determine if the juror has merely 'light impressions' or impressions which are 
'strong and deep' and which will affect the juror's impartiality." 810 P.2d at 443 . "When 
comments are made which facially question a prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, 
an abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or < 
unless the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted." Id. (citation 
omitted). But as Woolley recognizes, this requirement is conditioned upon a defendant 
objecting. Id. at 441-43. 
Here, defendants not only failed to object, their counsel affirmatively stipulated that 
the voir dire was adequate, affirmatively waived any for-cause objections to the four jurors, { 
and strategically chose not to use available peremptory challenges to remove them (T 494: 
118-19,147-48). Consequently, the Woolley standard does not apply. Instead, to challenge 
the voir dire for the first time on appeal, defendants must establish that (1) the trial court 
erred its voir dire, (2) the error was obvious, (3) the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial 
in that an actual bias juror sat, and (4) defendants did not invite the error. See State v. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^  7, 63 P.3d 110 (recognizing limitation placed on the plain 
error standard by the invited error doctrine). See also State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f^ 24, 24 
P.3d 948 (recognizing requirement that to show prejudice in voir dire, an appellant must 
establish that the failure to remove a juror resulted in the actual seating of a juror who was 
"partial or incompetent"). 
Furthermore, in considering whether defendants invited the alleged error, deference 
must be accorded to their trial counsel's legitimate personal preferences in selecting the jury 
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even if those choices appear "counterintuitive." See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 22, 
12 P.3d 92. "For instance, an attorney may make a reasoned judgment that a prospective 
juror's consciousness of, and concern for, his or her own potential bias actually provides a 
more sure foundation for confidence in that juror's reasoning processes. The attorney may 
even sense that the prospective juror is likely to 'overcompensate' by assigning more weight 
to or credibility to testimony that tends to oppose the juror's own potential bias." Id. "If 
defense counsel 'has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial 
court into error, [the appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the alleged 
plain error."18 Bloom field, 2003 UT App 3, f 7. 
Defendants'failure to acknowledge this precedent justifies summary rejection of their 
claim. See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, Iff 11-12. But even if the merits are considered, the 
claim fails. 
(B) Defendants Have Not Established Obvious Error in the Jury Voir Dire. 
Defendants claim that the trial court plainly erred in questioning: 
(1) Juror Scott Johnson concerning his wife's employment by Kanab City 
(Br.Aplt. at 25); 
(2) Juror Wendy Harris concerning her husband's and brother-in-law's 
employment by Kane County and her brother's employment by the Kanab City 
Police Department {Br.Aplt. at 26); 
(3) Juror Blane Harris concerning his relationship with his sister-in-law, Juror 
Wendy Harris (Br.Aplt at 27); and 
(4) Juror Justin Jones concerning his Utah residency and about pretrial 
exposure to the case (Br.Aplt. at 26). 
18
 In their Statement of Issues, defendants assert that their trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the jurors (Br.Aplt. at 2), but fail to present any 
argument on the point. Even if defendants had properly raised an ineffectiveness claim, 
the applicable standards would be the same. 
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According to defendants, the court asked essentially no follow-up questions of these jurors 
and did not properly consider the evidence produced in the post-trial hearing on Jones' 
residency {Br.Aplt. at 24-27). Defendants' contentions are without merit. 
The primary fallacy of defendants' argument is their assumption that government 
employment disqualifies a juror. It does not. Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states that "[a] prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because the juror 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof." Such associations 
may, of course, be relevant if a juror would be inclined to favor one side over the other. 
Here, the court extensively questioned the panel concerning their knowledge of and 
relationship to either of the parties, their attorneys, or any witness. This included the juror 
and their spouse employment (T 494: 39-57); whether they knew of or employed or were 
employed by any party, attorney, or witness (T 494: 57-62, 65, 70); whether they were 
related to any police officers or firemen (T 494:75,79,94); and whether they had any family 
relationships with other prospective jurors (T 494:95). The court spent some time explaining 
the type of relationships or influences that might bias a juror (T 494: 70-72, 76-77). The 
court explained that in a "fairly sparsely populated area" like Kane County, many people 
might be acquaintances, but the court was concerned with those relationships which might 
impact their judgement for or against a party {id.). The court also asked about pretrial 
publicity or exposure to the case (T 494: 82). Jurors who expressed knowledge of the case 
beyond minimal gossip were privately questioned (T 494: 111-45). 
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In all, the court removed for cause or otherwise excused 30 jurors (T 494: 30-31,1-4-
09,116,122,125,129,147,136-45). It denied only one of defendants' for-cause challenges 
(T 494: 140-43) and actively solicited additional challenges because the court had "plenty 
of jurors" (T 494: 147). At the end of voir dire, the court asked defense counsel if he had 
more questions or challenges; he did not (T 494: 156). The court then asked if defense 
counsel stipulated to the qualifications of the remaining jurors; he did (id.). When defense 
counsel sought two additional peremptory challenges over those given to the prosecution, the 
court granted them (T 494: 157). 
Juror Scott Johnson was a mechanic who lived in Kanab City for 53 years; his wife 
worked for Kanab City (T 494:39). He had no relationship with any one connected with the 
case and had no knowledge of the case (T 494: 147). Juror Johnson never indicated that he 
felt more inclined towards one party than the other. Defense counsel affirmatively waived 
any challenge to him and did not use a peremptory to remove him (T 494: 35, 147). See 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 25 (recognizing that when counsel fails to object to a juror, the 
"ordinary presumption" is that counsel made a justifiable strategic choice). Given counsel's 
actions, the court committed no obvious error in assuming that the voir dire was adequate and 
that defendants had actively chosen to retain Johnson on the jury. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT 
App 3, f 7 (recognizing that counsel's conscious choices preclude plain error review); State 
v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Utah App.) (recognizing that it would be improper to 
speculate as to counsel's reasoning in selecting a particular juror, where counsel was actively 
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i 
participating in the jury selection process), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). See 
also Addendum D. 
Juror Justin Jones lived in Kanab, but also lived (when working) on his father's ranch 
60 miles south of Kanab in Arizona (T 494: 43). He called what he knew about the case as 
nothing more than "gossip" (T 494: 85).I9 Counsel specifically waived any challenge for 
cause to him and chose not to use a peremptory to remove him (T 494: 35,148; T 503:4,18-
19). Defendants have established no obvious error in the court's assumption that voir dire 
was adequate and defendants wished to retain Jones. See id. 
Subsequently, defendants moved for new trial, claiming that Jones's voir dire 
responses were ambiguous and he "may not" be a Utah resident (T 503: 19-23, 30). They 
admitted, however, that Jones said he was a Utah resident, had a Utah license, voted in Utah, 
and had his family home in Kanab (T 503: 20-21). The court ruled that Jones qualified as 
a Utah resident and denied the motion (T 503: 4, 6, 31-31; BR 292-93; CR 474-75). 
Defendants have not established that the trial court committed obvious error in its ruling. See 
Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah App. 1995) (treating a post-
trial motion raising a voir dire challenge as a plain error argument). 
Juror Wendy Harris was Juror Blane Harris' sister-in-law (T 494: 78). The court 
throughly questioned them about their relationship (T 494: 77-79,103). Both Harrises 
19
 The trial court found that the transcript incorrectly attributed another juror's 
statement that he had spoken to two witnesses about the case to Jones (T 494: 86; T 503: 
16-19). Nevertheless, on appeal, defendants inappropriately claim that Jones made this 
statement (Br.Aplt. at 26). 
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indicated that they could and would exercise independent judgment (T 494: 78-79). Blane 
Harris suggested, in jest, that if they disagreed, they would have "a brawl" (T 494: 79). See 
Addendum D. 
Additionally, Wendy's husband worked for the county road department, her brother-
in-law (Blane's brother) was a Kane County jailer, and her brother was a Kane City police 
officer (T 494: 40, 75,117). Both Harrises were asked if they would credit a police officer 
over another witness (T 494: 75-77). Both responded that they would give equal weight to 
all witnesses (T 494: 77-78). Blane also explained that he was on a "mission" when the fire 
occurred and did not really know "the people here in Kanab that well" (T 494: 117-18). 
Defense counsel affirmatively waived any for-cause challenges to either Harris and did not 
remove either with a peremptory challenge (T 494: 118-19, 147-148). Again, counsel's 
actions preclude a finding of obvious error. 
(C) Defendants Have Not Established Prejudicial Error. 
Even if defendants could establish any obvious error in the voir dire of the four jurors, 
they can not establish prejudice because they failed to use available peremptory challenges 
to remove them. See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 36 & n.3 (reaffirming holding in State 
v. Baker, 935 503, 510 (Utah 1997), that available peremptories must be used to "cure" 
improper denial of a for-cause challenge). Moreover, there is no showing that any of the 
jurors who sat were partial. See id. at f 36 (reaffirming holding of State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), that prejudice does not accrue from errors in voir dire unless the 
complaining party demonstrates that a seated juror was "partial or incompetent"). 
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Consequently, defendants' plain error argument fails. See Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, % 
7 (recognizing that plain error requires a showing of prejudice). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE EXCHANGES 
BETWEEN TWO JURORS AND THE PROSECUTOR'S WIFE WERE 
EITHER BRIEF COMMON COURTESY OR RELATED TO A 
COMMUNITY MUSICAL PRODUCTION AND, THEREFORE, 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL 
Defendants moved for a new trial on the basis that jurors had improperly conversed 
with the prosecutor's wife during trial (BR 255-77; CR 426-50). The trial court conducted 
an evidentiary hearing during which the identified jurors and the prosecutor's wife testified 
(T 503:23-61; T 504:2-21). Based on the evidence, the court concluded that one juror, who 
did not know the prosecutor's wife, may have had a brief common courtesy exchange with 
her over the drinking fountain (BR 291-92; CR 473-74). Another juror approached the 
prosecutor's wife to tell her that they were both involved in a community musical (BR 291; 
CR 473). The court concluded the exchanges were insufficient to justify a new trial (BR 
290-91; CR 473-74). See Addendum E (Order Denying Motion for New Trial). The court's 
denial was a proper exercise of its discretion based on a correct application of the law. See 
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, J 45, 44 PJd 805 (recognizing that a denial of a motion for 
new trial will not be reversed "absent a clear abuse of discretion," unless the "legal standards 
applied by the trial court in denying the motion" are erroneous as a matter of law). 
It is well-settled that "any contact between a juror and witness, party, or court 
personnel that is more than a brief and incidental contact results in the attachment of a 
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rebuttable presumption of prejudice because it has the effect of 'breeding a sense of 
familiarity that could clearly affect the juror's judgment as to credibility/" State v. Tenney, 
913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah App.), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). But a rebuttable presumption of prejudice does not attach if the 
contact is "between a juror and an outsider under circumstances unrelated to the 
proceedings." Id. "In such a case, there is a presumption that the jurors have behaved 
properly, and it is the defendant's burden to provide some definite proof of misconduct and 
that the said misconduct is prejudicial." Id. (citation omitted). 
The inquiry is "a fact-driven exercise that will depend upon the circumstances of the 
case." State v. McKeen, 685 A.2d 1090,1092 (Vt. 1996). "Because the trial judge develops 
a relationship with the jury during the course of the trial, he or she is in the best position" to 
determine the impact of any contact. Id. "Consequently, every reasonable presumption in 
its favor is accorded to the ruling below." Id. at 1093. Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
906 (Utah App.) (presuming that the trial court properly exercises its discretion "unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary"), cert denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) .20 
Below, defendants conceded that the prosecutor's wife was not court personnel, but 
an "outsider," a trial spectator (T 503: 24). Consequently, as they recognized in the hearing, 
20
 The fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry compels an appellant to marshal the facts 
in support of the denial. See Subsection 1(A), supra. Defendants acknowledge the 
hearing facts, but do not "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence"as required under the 
marshaling standard. See Neely, 2002 UT App 189, f 12 & n.l. This justifies summary 
rejection of their claim. Alternatively, they fail on the merits. 
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propriety is presumed and the burden is on defendants to establish prejudicial misconduct (T 
503: 57-60; T 504: 16-19). 
Wendy Harris and the prosecutor's wife, Rebecca Winchester, testified in the hearing 
on the motion for new trial. They agreed they did not know each other at the time of the trial 
and neither specifically recalled any conversation with the other (T 503:40-42; T 504: 5-7). 
Ms. Winchester acknowledged that was possible, as defendants alleged, that they may have 
briefly exchange a common courtesy at the drinking fountain (id.). They did not discuss the 
trial (T 503: 54-55). Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded that no impermissible 
contact occurred (BR 291; CR 473; T 504: 20-21). See Addendum E. 
Cheryl Brown and Ms. Winchester testified concerning their conversation. The two 
knew each other prior to trial through mutual community activities (T 503:42-43; T 504: 9-
14). They agreed that on one occasion during the trial, Ms. Brown approached Ms. 
Winchester to discuss their mutual involvement in a community musical (id.).21 Brown 
represented that the conversation was no different than past conversations she may have had 
with Ms. Winchester when both were involved in community activities (T 504: 10). Both 
agreed that nothing beyond Ms. Brown's anticipated costumes for the Wizard of Oz 
production was discussed (T 503:43; T 504: 10,15). Both insisted that no aspect of the trial 
was discussed (T 503: 54-55; T 504: 12). The court concluded that the conversation was 
21
 Ms. Winchester testified this only occurred once (T 503: 46); Ms. Brown 
remembered this conversation specifically, but was unsure if she may have greeted Ms. 
Winchester in common courtesy on some other occasion (T 504: 14). 
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"insufficient" to justify a new trial because it did not impact the "objectivity or fairness of 
the jury" (BR 291; CR 473; T 504: 20-21).. 
The court's ruling is correct. The Harris contact was de minius and clearly did not call 
into question the impartiality of the jury. See Jonas, 793 P.2d at 909 (recognizing that 
common courtesy exchanges are expected and unavoidable during a trial). The Brown 
contact was more substantial, but amounted to no more than a social contact with an outsider. 
As such, it is not prohibited. See Tenney, 913 P.2d at 757. Moreover, even if it were 
prohibited, no possibility of prejudice resulted: the conversation did not relate to the trial. 
See Tenney, 913 P.2d at 758 (finding discussion of case with outsider improper, but not so 
prejudicial as to require a new trial); State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977) 
(concluding that social conversation between jurors and officers who were witnesses in the 
case was improper, but not prejudicial). Consequently, the court did not clearly abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for new trial. 
POINTIV 
THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS 
DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON 
Defendants contend their convictions must be reversed because the State's expert did 
not know what ignition source was used to start the fire (Br.Aplt. at 39-41). Defendants also 
argue their convictions cannot stand because Michael Leighton was not "investigated and 
eliminated"as a suspect (Br.Aplt at 42-44). Neither argument supports reversal. 
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(A) The Sufficiency Challenge Should Not Be Reviewed Because Defendants 
Fail to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the Verdicts and Have Not Fully 
Preserved Their Challenge. 
A jury verdict will only be reversed for insufficient evidence if the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."' State v. Hamilton, 2003 
UT 22,118 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). In attacking a jury 
verdict, the appellant bears "an extremely heavy burden" to thoroughly marshal the evidence. 
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, f 16, 52 P.3d 1168. Here, defendants fail to met that burden. 
Defendants' Statement of Facts consists of two pages (Br.Aplt. at 5-6). Only one 
record citation relates to the trial, and that is to the prosecutor's opening argument (Br.Aplt. 
at 6, citing T494:182-84). The other record citations are to the pretrial suppression hearing. 
Defendants' factual recitation does not fairly represent the evidence presented during their 
seven-day jury trial. Compare State fs Statement of Facts, supra. Summary affirmance is, 
therefore, justified. See Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, % 11. 
Moreover, defendants preserved only of their two grounds for claiming the evidence 
is insufficient. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, J^ 16 (requiring an appellant to preserve a 
sufficiency challenge by "proper motion or objection"). Defendants did move to dismiss on 
the ground that the prosecution failed to establish precisely how the fire was ignited (T 497: 
965-967). However, they did not move to dismiss on the ground that the evidence pointed 
to Leighton rather than them, although they did argue in closing that Leighton, "should be 
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considered suspicious" (T 500:45-47).n This tangential closing argument does not preserve 
this portion of defendants' current legal challenge. See id. Consequently, the State does not 
address it. 
(B) The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion to Dismiss Because Proof 
of the Precise Means Used to Ignite an Intentional Fire is Not Required. 
Even if the merits of defendants' preserved claim is considered, the evidence fully 
supports the jury verdicts. 
Defendants' sufficiency argument is based on a false premise. Contrary to 
defendants' assertion, the prosecution was not required to prove the precise method used to 
ignite the fire, only that fire was intentionally used to damage a habitable building. As the 
trial court correctly noted, "it is very common in arson cases that you don't have [an] 
eyewitness that somebody lighted a match, so I think you draw those inferences from all the 
other facts" (T 497: 967). See State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,332-33 (Utah 1991) (upholding 
"close"and "entirely" circumstantial arson conviction); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 
n.3 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing circumstantial nature of arson cases). 
Moreover, the elements of aggravated arson are that (1) a habitable structure (2) was 
intentionally damaged (3) by means of a fire. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103(1 )(a). Proof 
Leighton, who was then incarcerated in the Utah State prison, testified that 
while a fireman, he abused drugs and was subsequently convicted in Nevada of a drug 
offense (T 497: 864,908-10). He also admitted that in 1999, he pled guilty to 
burglarizing some storage units in Kanab (T 497: 867-68, 911). His only connection to 
the Frontier fire is that he was one of the firemen who responded to the alarm and was 
later left alone for a few hours to watch the burned premises (T 495: 314; T 497: 901-02, 
913-14). Leighton invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked if he stole any cash from 
the restaurant's cash register during his watch (T 497: 867). In returning the guilty 
verdicts, the jury necessarily rejected that the evidence pointed to Leighton. 
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of the manner of ignition is not required, but may be relevant as additional circumstantial 
evidence of the intended result. See Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472-73 (recognizing critical element 
of intent to cause damage by means of a fire, but not requiring additional proof of the specific 
means by which the fire was set). In sum, the trial court properly refused to dismiss the case. 
(C) The Circumstantial Evidence Establishes that the Fire Was Intentional 
Even though the precise means used to ignite the fire was never determined, the 
evidence in this case fully supports the jury's conclusion that the fire was intentional. 
The State's expert determined that accelerant was used in the attic to more quickly 
spread the fire which began around the attic access (T 495: 501). This conclusion was based 
on the degree of carbonization in the attic and the main floor bathroom wall, the mid-wall 
bum pattern in the bathroom, the high temperature and intensity of the fire, the horizontal 
bum pattern across the attic floor, and the condition of the wood surrounding the attic access 
(T 495: 482-86.490-98,501-03, 503-06, 510; T 496: 585-87, 597-98). See Span, 819 P.2d 
at 332 (recognizing validity of expert opinion based on bum patterns and smell of accelerant, 
even though subsequent testing did not confirm presence of accelerant); State v. Schultz, 
2002 UT App 366, If 11,16 & 33,58 P.3d 879 (recognizing validity of expert opinion based 
on same factors, plus canine accelerant alert, even in absence of laboratory confirmation of 
accelerant); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App.) (recognizing validity of 
expert opinion based on same factors, plus visual but not laboratory-verified presence of 
gasoline), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). In rendering his opinion that the fire was 
intentional, Borg took into account the natural fuel load in the attic and physically examined 
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and handled the attic wiring and electrical panel to eliminate accidental causes for the fire 
(T 495: 467-70, 503-06; T 496: 584-85, 593-98, 600-06, 638-43, 654-55, 673-74). See id. 
Based on his personal "hands-on" examination of the premises just hours after the fire 
was extinguished, Borg was positive that the Frontier fire was intentionally set (T 495: 665, 
676). Unlike defendants' experts, Borg also appropriately considered the extensive evidence 
of arson preparation and verified presence of accelerant in the basement (T 495:446-49,454-
63; T 496: 620-27, 656-57). He just could not determine the precise means (match, lighter, 
etc.) by which the accelerant was ignited in the attic (T 496: 616, 676). See Scheel, 823 
P.2d at 473 n.4 (affirming aggravated arson conviction where expert opined that fire was 
intentional, but could not determine the precise method of ignition). 
The fact that the parties' experts conflicted in their opinions does not provide a basis 
to overturn the jury verdict. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332 n.l (upholding arson conviction 
despite conflicting expert opinions on whether fire was intentionally set). The jury was 
entitled to accept one expert opinion over the other or reject both and rely on their own 
evaluation of the evidence. See Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328 
P.2d 730,80-81 (Utah 1958) (recognizing jury's prerogative in weighing expert testimony). 
Here, the jury's rejection of the defense experts' opinions was warranted. The defense 
experts only examined the premises months after the fire and refused to consider all the 
evidence found at the scene at the time of the fire (T 498: 1207,1229-30; T 499: 154,164). 
Additionally, the electrical expert agreed that an electrical fire could result from intentional 
manipulation of the wires (T 498: 1221 -22). The arson expert admitted that it would be rare 
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for an accidental electrical fire to occur at the same time and place as preparations for an 
arson fire (T 499: 173). See State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1986) (upholding 
jury's rejection of claim that it was "pure coincidence" that fire was set in same manner as 
"joking" threat). In sum, the evidence fully supports the verdicts. See State v. Nickles, 728 
P.2d 123,125-26(Utah 1986) (holding that evidence ofarson was "substantial" and "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" where defendants excluded others from access to their house, claimed 
to be on an out-of-state trip, removed personal belongings and papers from the house, fire 
investigators found accelerant-soaked papers and "trailers" in the bedrooms, and the burn 
patterns indicated the use of an accelerant). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' convictions for aggravated arson should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c$$ day of May, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General • 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424J 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) SEARCH WARRANT 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 981600031 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL, POLICE 
OFFICER, OR ANY OTHER PEACE OFFICER WITHIN KANE COUNTY: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day 
before me by ALAN ALLDREDGE that he has reason to believe, and I 
am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe, that in or 
about the real property that is operated as the Frontier Bar-B-Q 
& Steak Restaurant (main floor restaurant and basement living 
quarters), which property is located within Kanab City, Kane 
County, State of Utah, and is more particularly described as 1143 
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( ( 
South Highway 89A, there is presently certain property or 
evidence, which property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or 
unlawfully possessed, and consists of any item or constitutes 
evidence of arson or reckless burning, possessed or left by a 
party to the illegal conduct, 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search of the 
above-described real property, including the curtilage and all 
outbuildings and personal property located on or about the 
curtilage. Because the owners/operators are out of town, you 
need not serve this warrant upon anyone prior to making the 
search. The search may be conducted at any time during the day. 
You are to prepare a written inventory of the property or 
evidence seized and make a verified return of the warrant to the 
Court, together with the written inventory, stating the place 
where the seized property is being held. You shall be 
responsible for the safekeeping and maintenance of the property 
until the further order of the Court. 
DATED this 24th day of March, 1998. 
GERRY H. HOYTX 
Magistrate 
Time of Issuance: //:J/X O^*M-
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN DOE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN ALLDREDGE 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 981600031 
) 
) JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
ALAN ALLDREDGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a certified firefighter, and am the Chief of the 
Kanab City Fire Department. 
2, At approximately 4:15 a.m. on March 24, 1998, a fire 
was observed at the Frontier Bar-B-Q & Steak Restaurant, located 
at 1143 South Highway 89A, Kanab, Kane County, Utah. 
4. The fire was first observed by Kanab resident Dave 
Winkleman, who went to the residence of Robert Schafer, 
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turn called Kane County Dispatch. 
3. Prior to the time firefighters arrived, Dave Winkleman 
and Kanab City Police Officer Brett Smith entered the building to 
ensure that no one was inside. The basement of the building is 
purportedly used by the owners of the business as a residence. 
No one was located inside the building. 
4. The fire caused substantial damage to the roof and 
dining area located in the southwest corner of the building. The 
fire also caused smoke damage throughout the building. 
5. The suppression of the fire caused water damage 
throughout the building. 
6. In the two basement bedrooms, located on the west side 
of the building, drawers had been removed from dressers and 
stacked up in a pyramid fashion, much like a person would stack 
wood for a campfire or a bonfire. 
7. Parts of the drywall ceiling above the stacks of 
drawers had been cut and torn away, exposing the floor joists. 
The drywall pieces had been removed from the building, and as of 
the time this Affidavit was executed, have not been located. 
8. There is a strong smell of solvent, such as paint 
thinner, paint remover, or turpentine, throughout the basement. 
9. There is a storage closet in the basement, used as a 
food pantry for the restaurant. The storage closet/food pantry 
is located on the west side of the building, between the two 
2 
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bedrooms. 
10. The solvent smell is stronger in the storage 
closet/food pantry than it is throughout the rest of the 
basement. 
11. Part of the drywall ceiling of the storage closet/food 
pantry has been cut and torn away, exposing the floor joists. 
The drywall pieces had been removed from the building, and as of 
the time this Affidavit was executed, have not been located. On 
the top shelf of the storage closet/food pantry, just beneath the 
removed drywall, packages of restaurant style napkins have been 
placed at intervals, rather than stacked neatly together. 
12. The purported owners of the business, Dorothy Carpenter 
and Robert Beltran, are, according to Kanab resident Joe Johnson, 
in the Phoenix or Mesa area, and have been out of town for 
several days. Mr, Johnson is an auto body repairman/ mechanic, 
and is working on Ms. Carpenter's 1991 Camaro. 
13. In the restaurant kitchen, which is located in the 
southeast portion of the main floor, there is a 1/2 gallon 
container of orange juice on a table or countertop, with a small 
amount of orange juice still present. Located next to the orange 
juice container is a coffee cup filled approximately 1/2 full of 
orange juice. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of March 
24, 1998, the orange juice in the container and the orange juice 
in the coffee cup were cold to the touch. 
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14. There are no apparent signs of forced entry into the 
building, except those entries made by firefighters and law 
enforcement personnel. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this 24th of March, 1998. 
ALAN ALLDREDGE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 24th day of March, 
1998. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
^... COUH ' * ^ C K £ 3 T ^ 
/&~Wy pr.nm -VJ3JC'SVJz x L-fiW 
fe>-\iV S.»1TU«EC!TY.UT 84121 
H<r-Sy coaa. EXPIRES 12-n-aa 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATEOFUTAH 
RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 981600031 
The property listed below was taken from the premises located and described as a business 
and residence located at 1143 South Hwy 89A Kanab, Utah, by virtue of a search warrant 
dated March 24,1998 and executed by Gerry H. Hoyt, Magistrate of the above entitled court. 
Item 01 One pair of Nike tennis shoes I south outside porch 
Item 02 One pair of Nike tennis shoes I inside of south door 
Item 03 Coffee mug • kitchen counter 
Item 04 Yellow flashlight - kitchen counter 
Item#5 One piece of dry wall-bed of GMCmck 
Item 06 One piece of dry wall « southwest basement bedroom ceiling 
Item 07 Newspaper - shelf of basement middle bedroom 
Item 08 Cardboard sample • basement pantry 
Item 09 Red punt-southwest basement bedroom dresser 
Item 010 Two photographs - southwest basement bedroom dresser 
Item 011 Fluid Sample • outside shed 
Item 012 One gallon paint thinner - outside shed 
Item 013 Clothing sample • southwest basement bedroom dresser 
Item 014 Clothing sample • northwest basement bedroom dresser 
Item 015 One receipt - northwest basement bedroom dresser 
All items listed above are being held in the Kanab City Police Department evidence locker. 
'mm$m Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
I Sergeant Thomas C. Cram, by whom the Warrant was executed, do swear the above 
listed inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me under 
the warrant on March 24, 1998. 
All of the property taken by me by virtue of said Warrant will be retained in my 
custody subject to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect 
to which the property or things taken is triable. 
G Cram, Sergeant 
Kanab City Police Department 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1998 
V A *> • '''/•' * A N A ft. U T S 414 » 
v
-^us."-- / :OMM. EX? * ?aoi 
I 
L2L 
Notary ?^ IC nunh'nrp 
'1'1-lMl 
Commission Expiration Date 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] \ ^ % £ o. ''' 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY S > \ V /Qo 
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267] ^0^<|N- ^ 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 5 ^ V % \ 
34 North Main Street On,: C;„ 
Kanab, Utah 84741 ''"'S> " 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT BELTRAN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 981600101 
JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court on October 29, 1999 
pursuant to Defendant's motion seeking re-consideration of the 
previously denied motion to suppress. The State of Utah was 
represented by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester. 
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, John E. 
Hummel. The parties argued their respective positions before the 
Court. The Court, having reviewed the file, having reviewed the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing, having heard the testimony 
offered at the original motion to suppress, and having heard and 
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considered the arguments of counsel, now therefore, enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 24, 1998, at approximately 4:15 a.m., a fire 
was seen at the Frontier Bar-B-Q restaurant ("the restaurant") in 
Kanab, Utah. 
2. The restaurant building serves as both a commercial 
restaurant and a residence, the residence being located in the 
basement. 
3. Firefighters from the Kanab City Fire Department 
arrived at the fire at approximately 4:30 a.m. Fire Chief Alan 
Alldredge was the first firefighter on the scene. 
4. The fire was located mainly in the restaurant's roof 
structure. 
5. In the process of checking the premises for persons 
and/or other fires, firefighters went into the basement of the 
restaurant. They saw that dresser drawers had been removed from 
their dressers and stacked in piles under at least two locations 
where drywall had been removed from the basement ceiling, 
exposing the floor joists of the main floor. They also saw that 
boards had been placed on the basement floor, running from one 
stack of dresser drawers to the other stack(s). 
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•76. The firefighters notified Chief Alldredge of the things 
they had seen in the basement, and Chief Alldredge made a cursory 
inspection of the basement. 
7. The county attorney was called to the scene at 
approximately 6:30 a.m., and together with one or more 
firefighters, made a cursory inspection of the basement and the 
main floor of the restaurant. 
8. The county attorney then went to his office and 
prepared an affidavit and a search warrant. The affidavit was 
executed by Chief Alldredge, and the search warrant was then 
presented to, and issued by, a magistrate. The affidavit 
described the items seen by the firefighters and the county 
attorney in some detail, but the search warrant described the 
items to be seized only as "evidence of arson or reckless 
burning." 
9. The search warrant was executed later that same day by 
Chief Alldredge, Sgt. Tom Cram of the Kanab City Police 
Department, and Lynn Borg, Chief Investigator of the Utah State 
Fire Marshal's Office. Sgt. Cram did not read the search warrant 
before it was executed. 
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10. During the execution of the search warrant, photographs 
were taken, videotapes were made, and the following items were 
seized: 
(1) a pair of Nike tennis shoes 
(2) a pair of Nike tennis shoes 
(3) a coffee mug 
(4) a yellow flashlight 
(5) a piece of drywall from the bed of Mr. Beltran's truck 
(6) a piece of drywall from the basement 
(7) a newspaper from a shelf in the basement 
(11) a fluid sample from the outside shed 
(12) a gallon of paint thinner from the outside shed 
(13) a clothing sample from the basement 
(14) a clothing sample from the basement 
(15) a receipt from the basement 
Some photographs were taken, and some videotape footage was 
shot, from the bucket of a bucket truck, looking down into the 
damaged roof of the restaurant. The bucket truck had been 
brought onto the premises by the firefighters. 
11. After the initial search pursuant to the search warrant 
was completed, another search was made and the following items 
were seized: 
(8) a cardboard sample from the basement 
(9) a red purse from the basement 
(10) two photographs from the basement 
12. Item.(5)# the piece of drywall from the bed of Mr. 
Beltranfs truck, was first seen by Captain Mike Royce of the Utah 
Highway Patrol. Captain Royce is a pilot who had flown Chief 
Investigator Borg to Kanab. The piece of drywall was in plain 
view. 
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CONLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial entries into the restaurant and the 
basement by the firefighters, Chief Alldredge, and the county 
attorney were either for the purpose of extinguishing the fire or 
investigating the cause of the blaze. All such entries were 
completed within a reasonable time. None of those entries 
violate the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, as per Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 
(1978), and Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984). 
2. The search warrant included suitable words of reference 
to the affidavit executed in support thereof See State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985). 
3. Because the search warrant was executed by the signer 
of the affidavit in support thereof, the lack of specificity in 
the search warrant may be bolstered by the specificity in the 
affidavit. See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985). 
4. When read together, the affidavit and the search 
warrant contain sufficient specificity of the items to be seized. 
5. The search warrant was also executed by Chief 
Investigator Borg, who has sufficient expertise to know and 
understand what items constituting "evidence of arson or reckless 
burning" fife p. £iUV\ 
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6. The executors of the search warrant acted pursuant to a 
valid search warrant, and the fruits of the search are protected 
by the Leon doctrine. 
7. Items (8), (9), and (10) should be suppressed because 
they were seized subsequent to the initial execution of the 
search warrant. 
8. Items (1), (2), (3), and (4) should be suppressed 
because they would not ordinarily constitute '"evidence of arson 
or reckless burning." 
. 9«.: Item (5) and the videotape and photographs taken from 
the bucket truck should not be suppressed because all are subject 
to the plain view doctrine. 
DATED this f^2r day of December, 19-99. 
BY THE COURT: 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ORDER DENYING 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 981600101 
JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court on October 29, 1999 
pursuant to Defendant's motion seeking re-consideration of the 
previously denied motion to suppress. The State of Utah was 
represented by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R. Winchester. 
The Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, John E. 
Hummel. The parties argued their respective positions before the 
Court. The Court reviewed the file, reviewed the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing, heard the testimony offered at the 
original motion to suppress, heard and considered the arguments 
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1 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT BELTRAN, 
Defendant. 
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of counsel, and previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
- 1. Items (1), (2), (3), (4), (8), (9), and (10) are hereby 
suppressed. 
2. All other items, including but not limited to, seized 
items, photographs and videotapes, are not suppressed. 
DATED this day of December, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
STATE OP UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN 
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Exhibit No. 7 
"TRAILERS" IN HALLWAY 
(T 495:455-456) 
Exhibit No. 6 
DRESSER IN 
CARPENTER'S 
BEDROOM 
(T 495:454-55) 
Exhibit No. 10 
DRESSER IN 
BELTRAN'S 
BEDROOM 
(T 495:459-60) 
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ARTICLE Vin 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Section 
1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law uncon-
stitutional — Justice unable to participate.) 
3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.) 
4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges pro 
tempore — Regulation of practice of law.) 
5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — Right of 
appeal.] 
6. [Number of judges of district court and other courts — 
Divisions.) 
7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate ap-
proval.] 
9. [Judicial retention elections.] 
10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.] 
11. [Judges of courts not of record.] 
12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer 
— Legal counsel] 
13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
14. [Compensation of justices and judges.] 
15. [Mandatory retirement] 
16. [Public prosecutors.] 
17 to 28. [Repealed.] 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, 
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by 
Statute. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts 
— Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal 
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec; 11. [Judges of courts not of record.] 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner, 
for a term, and with qualifications provided by statute. How-
ever, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of 
courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number 
of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 
1984 (2nd S.S.) 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(V A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal 
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the 
cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the adden-
dum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged 
and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authori-
ties cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they 
are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appel-
late court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including 
for each issue: the standard of appellate review with support-
ing authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was pre-
served in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue 
not preserved in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the 
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of 
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indi-
cate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, 
suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not 
be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the conten-
tions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
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(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no 
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound sepa-
rately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation 
of central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced 
verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court 
of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central 
importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part 
of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings' of fact and conclusions of 
law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
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Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the 
jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or other-
wise prior to trial. The following procedures for selection are 
not exclusive. 
(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all 
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for 
cause granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call 
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine 
challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the 
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, 
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, 
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such 
new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges 
for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the 
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecu-
tion, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one 
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk 
shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as 
shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any alter-
nate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall 
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the 
last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional 
number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory 
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. 
At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges 
for cause during the course of questioning or at the end 
thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall 
hear and determine challenges for cause outside the hearing 
of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the 
clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its 
peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn 
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them 
as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any 
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called 
shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, 
the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors geherated in 
random order by computer, the clerk may call the jurors in 
that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court may 
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examina-
tion by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors additional questions re-
quested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to examining the 
jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the 
case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the 
parties in advance of trial. 
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(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual 
juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular 
court or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the 
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be 
taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a 
material departure from the procedure prescribed with re-
spect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury 
is sworn and shall be in writing or made upon the record. It 
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of 
the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse 
party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any 
other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing 
thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to 
the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far 
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, 
the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremp-
tory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be 
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the 
court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror 
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel 
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause 
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for 
which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is 
entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases 
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misde-
meanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may 
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and 
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror 
and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror 
challenged and any other person may be examined as a 
witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause 
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its 
own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same 
grounds. 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one 
incapable of performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the 
person alleged to be injured by the offense charged!, or on 
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or 
other relationship between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the pro-
spective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not 
be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or 
employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant 
in a civil action, or having complained against or having been 
accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indict-
ment; 
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(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another 
person for the particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same 
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was dis-
charged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against 
the defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the 
entertaining of opinions about the death penalty as would 
preclude the juror from voting to impose the death penalty 
following conviction or would require the juror to impose the 
death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has 
been engaged or interested in carrying on any business, 
calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a violation 
of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or 
against the defendant on the preliminary examination or 
before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or 
belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circum-
stances that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is 
not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if 
challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and 
will act impartially and fairly. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the pros-
ecution and then by the defense alternately. Challenges for 
cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are 
taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. 
Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall 
replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform 
their duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be 
chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and 
in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall 
be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take 
the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and 
privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceed-
ings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror 
shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld 
until the jurors begin deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered 
to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will 
well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and 
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the 
instructions of the court. 
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty 
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes it 
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction 
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the 
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed 
to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged with-
out violating his probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the pros-
ecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either 
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice 
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this 
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or 
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any 
person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his 
record as provided by law. isei 
76-6-101. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter 
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or 
tangible personal property which is capable of being 
damaged or destroyed and includes a habitable structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, 
trailer, railway car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging 
or assembling persons or conducting business whether a 
person is actually present or not 
(3) "Property* is that of another, if anyone other than 
the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in any 
portion thereof. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if totally 
destroyed, at the time and place of the offense, or 
where cost of replacement exceeds the market value; 
or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, 
the cost of repairing or replacing the property within 
a reasonable time following the offense. 
(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be 
ascertained by the criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and 
(b) above, the property shall be deemed to have a value 
less than $300. iees 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire 
or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a 
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. i9SS 
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77-1-3. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a 
person is charged, accused, and brought to trial for a 
public offense. 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing pre-
sented by a grand jury to the district court charging a 
person with a public offense. 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, 
charging a person with a public offense which is pre-
sented, signed, and filed in the office of the clerk where the 
prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 77-2-1.1. 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of 
record or not of record or a commissioner of such a court 
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31, except that 
the authority of a court commissioner to act as a magis-
trate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The 
judicial council rules shall not exceed constitutional limi-
tations upon the delegation of judicial authority. iws 
77-23-201. Search warrant* - Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and 
ending at 10 p.m. local time. 
(2) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate 
in the name of the state and directed to a peace officer, 
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to 
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by 
him and brought before the magistrate. 2001 
78-5-101. Creation of justice court — Not of record. 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is 
created a court not of record known as the justice court. The 
judges of this court are justice court judges. iwt 
78-5-106. Justice court judge authority. 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within 
their jurisdiction as judges of courts of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest 
upon a finding of probable cause; and 
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within their juris-
diction; and 
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own 
recognizance. l 989 
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78-7-17.5. Authority of magistrate. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as 
defined in Section 77-1-3 shall have the authority to: 
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial; 
(b) set or deny bail under Section 77-20-1 and release 
upon the payment of bail and satisfaction of any other 
conditions of release; 
(c) issue to any place in the state summonses and 
warrants of search and arrest and authorize administra-
tive traffic checkpoints under Section 77-23-104; 
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony; 
(e) conduct arraignments; 
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause; 
(g) appoint attorneys and order recoupment of attorney 
fees; 
(h) order the preparation of presentence investigations 
and reports; 
(i) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council; and 
(j) perform any other act or function authorized by 
statute. 
(2) A judge of the justice court may exercise the authority of 
a magistrate specified in Subsection (1) with the following 
limitations: 
(a) a judge of the justice court may conduct an initial 
appearance, preliminary examination, or arraignment in 
a felony case as provided by rule of the Judicial Council; 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on t h e o ^ ^ day of December, 1999, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS to each person listed below: 
John E. Hummel (via first class mail) 
165 North 100 East #5 
St. George, Utah 84770 
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN 
Case No. 981600101 
3 • ' y\ 
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FILED 
l /AMP (^Ol IMTV 
JUL 0 91999 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. Clerk 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (435) 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
. ) • 
STATE OF UTAH, ) ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH 
) SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, ) EVIDENCE SEIZED 
• : • ' ) ' " • ' 
VS. ) 
" " ' • ' . • • • " . ) 
DOROTHY DEE CARPENTER, ) 
) CaseNo.981600100FS 
Defendant. ) Honorable K.L. Mclff 
_ _ _ _ ) • 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable K.L. Mclff, 
District Judge, on Friday, 12 March 1999, pursuant to Defendant's "Motion to Quash Search 
Warrant and Suppress Evidence Seized". Defendant Dorothy Dee Carpenter appeared 
personally, and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Plaintiff State 
of Utah appeared by and through its attorney of record, Mr. Colin R. Winchester, Kane County 
Attorney. Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. Following the presentation of 
evidence, argument was had. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That Defendant's "Motion to Quash Search Warrant'', pertaining to that particular 
search warrant issued on or about March 24, 1997, for the search of Defendant's residence and 
place of business, should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied. 
2. That the following items of evidence shall not be permitted to be offered into 
evidence by the State of Utah at the time of trial of this matter: 
A. One pair of Nike tennis shoes, located on the south, outside porch. 
B. One pair of Nike tennis shoes, located inside of south door. 
C. Coffee mug, located on kitchen counter. 
D. Yellow flashlight, located on kitchen counter. 
E. Cardboard sample, located in basement pantry. 
F. Red purse, located in southwest basement bedroom dresser. 
G. Two photographs, located on southwest bedroom dresser. 
H. Any and all evidence located or seized by the State of Utah in the absence 
ofLynnBorg. 
I. That Plaintiff State of Utah shall not be permitted to offer into evidence, 
notes ofLynnBorg. 
2 
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f. 
DATED this l/J day of dj 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
_, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
K.L. McIFFnDistrict Judge 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
/ 
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information from you. My name is Kay Mclff. I serve as 
judge of the sixth district court. The sixth district 
court covers everything from the center part of the state 
from the Utah County line on the north to the Arizona 
border on the south. I have the privilege to sit in six 
different courthouses, Kane County, of course, on the 
southern end. My home is in Richfield. My wife and I have 
lived there now for 32 years. I practiced law there for 26 
years. Since then I have been serving on the bench. My 
wife's name is Rene. She was an educator during the early 
part of our marriage, taught junior high school, then was a 
full time mom for the balance of that time. We have five 
children. Three of those children are married. Two of 
them remain unmarried and are at Utah State University. 
Now, that gives you just a little glimpse into who 
we are and what my wife has done and what I've done. And 
we would like to find out that same information about each 
of you. And I'm going to start with you, Mr. Johnson. 
Will you tell us about yourself and your wife, family and 
employment education, those kinds of things. 
MR. SCOTT JOHNSON: My name's Scott Johnson. I 
work for Redhead's. I am a mechanic. My wife is Ralene. 
She works for the Kanab City. And I have three children. 
I have lived here for 53 years. 
THE COURT: Does your wife work outside the home? 
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MR. SCOTT JOHNSON: She works for Kanab City, 
yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Wendy C. Harris. 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: It's L. 
THE COURT: Beg your pardon? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: It's an "L" instead of a "C." 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll make that correction. 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: I'm from this area. Lived here 
all my life. I am married, have four children nine and 
under. I am a homemaker. I do have a bachelor's degree in 
elementary education in resource. 
THE COURT: Your husband? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: He works for the county. 
THE COURT: What's his name? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Burt Harris. 
county? 
THE COURT: What kind of work does he do for the 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: On the road department. 
THE COURT: Okay. Rhonda E. Flatberg. 
MS. FLATBERG: Hi. I live in Orderville now. I 
have lived in California. I have been in Orderville for 
six and-a-half years. I am not working right now. I 
worked as a medical assistant and EMT and various other 
things. My husband, John, is a consultant for airlines. 
He travels internationally quite a bit. I have one son and 
40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
three grandchildren. And they live in Kanab. It's right 
here. 
THE COURT: Thank you, very much. Michael W. 
Evangelista. 
MR. EVANGELISTA: Yes. I'm the one son. I don't 
know how random this is. I have been in Kanab, let's see, 
two years now. Before that I lived in Orderville for a 
few. And I'm sole, full time employee of the local 
newspaper here in Kanab. I'm also the single father of 
three children and a bunch of other things. But that's 
probably all that's relevant. 
THE COURT: When you say sole employee, do they 
have other, anyone else? 
MR. EVANGELISTA: There is one other lady 
sometimes. I am the main editorial assistant and do 
everything that's required to do with the newspaper. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Blane T. 
Harris. 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Resident of Glendale for about 
all my life. I just returned from a mission about a year 
ago. And I am currently employed with South-Central 
Communications Telephone. 
THE COURT: Okay. Single? 
•MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Kevin D. Tullis. ' 
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MR. HEATON: Twelve to six. 
THE COURT: Okay. And your wife works? She works 
in the home? She's a homemaker? 
MR. HEATON: Pretty much homemaker, yeah. 
THE COURT: Shirl W. Spencer. 
MR. SPENCER: I live in Glendale. I have lived in 
this area most of my life. I am married, have eight 
children, 13 grandchildren. Currently, I am the principal 
at Valley High School. My wife manages a convenience store 
in Mount Carmel Junction. 
THE COURT: Okay. Minor children at home? 
MR. SPENCER: I have an 18 year old at home. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Curtis J. 
Burgoyne. 
MR. BURGOYNE: I am Curtis. I work at Smith 
Pattern and Tooling. I am married to Wendy. We have three 
kids. I grew up in California and pretty much moved out 
here after I graduated from high school. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Justin R. Jones. 
MR. JUSTIN JONES: I live in Kanab. I live on a 
ranch about 60 miles outside of Kanab. I run it for my 
dad. I am married to Joanie, my wife. And we got a 20 
month old little girl. And she works at the ranch with me. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Arlene W. Goulding? 
MS. GOULDING: I have been married to Clyde for 53 
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He was in construction. Grading and paving. 
THE COURT: Okay. Eric C. Brown. 
MR. BROWN: E. Brown. 
THE COURT: What is it? Eric E.? Thank you. 
MR. BROWN: I was born here in Kanab. I_wenfc,,to 
school in Ogden for five years, came back here aTicr started 
a welding shop. Did that for seven years. Closed it down 
two weeks ago. Just started working for Waterman Welding. 
THE COURT: Wife? 
MR. BROWN: Single. 
THE COURT: And Rinda Alldredge. 
MS. ALLDREDGE: Lived in Kanab most of my life. I 
was raised in Orderville. I am married to Hallen. We run 
the Junction Drive-in here in Kanab. I graduated from 
college SUU with a degree in communications. And my 
husband is also the fire chief here in town. And I am 
bookkeeper for my parents' business also. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm going to 
ask you now some questions about relationships. And I'm 
going to just kind of go down the line and see if you have 
any of these relationships. Please tell me. And I am 
concerned about relationships with any of the parties or 
the lawyers or the witnesses who will be called. I am 
going to allow the lawyers now to introduce themselves and 
tell us who their witnesses will be. I'll also allow the 
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defense counsel to introduce his clients. Mr. Winchester. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Thank you, Your Honor. My name 
is Colin Winchester. I have lived here in Kanab for about 
five and-a-half years. I'm married to Rebecca Winchester. 
She's a teacher's aid at the Kanab Elementary School. We 
have five children at home. Oldest onefs in high school. 
Youngest is somewhere in elementary school. I don't keep 
track. He's this big. 
Will be at times assisted by Chris Rasmussen who 
works in my office. Chris and his wife have lived here for 
about a year now, two years --' 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Year and-a-half,, 
MR. WINCHESTER: -- and they have three children. 
One of them is brand spanking new. 
We have a long list of witnesses. I'll try to 
tell you their names and perhaps where they are from, 
Michael Royce is from Salt Lake City; Bruce Tobler, St. 
George; Lynn Borg, Salt Lake City; Jennifer McNair, Salt 
Lake City; Dennis Fleming, St. George; Sheldon Sorensen, 
here in Kanab. He works for the special service district. 
I think his wife is in the jury panel. Jamie Mackelprang. 
She's married to the Kanab City attorney. Miss 
Mackelprang, she lives here in Kanab. Laurie Stewart in 
Kanab; Oran Peck, from St. George; Joe Johnson, Kanab. 
Then there are several fire fighters. We won't be 
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calling all of these fire fighters, but we may call several 
of them. Stan White, Aaron Wilson, Tracy Cutler, Dilworth 
Perkins, Nate White, Keith Robinson and, of course, Alan 
Alldredge, the fire chief; former Kanab City police officer 
by the name of Bret Smith who now lives in Phoenix, Dave 
Winkleman. They are from Kanab. I believe his family 
still lives here. And I think he's working in St. George. 
Seated behind me is Tom Cram with the city police 
department. Kelly Fischer from Colorado City; perhaps Jeff 
Mosdell, another fire fighter; perhaps Michael Leighton, 
former resident of Kanab; Jim Hooper, I think out of St. 
George; Chase Van Slooten, a young man who lives here in 
Kanab; Cindy Montgomery, who lives here in Kanab; Don Ross, 
I believe Sedona, Arizona, or Oak Creek Village, Arizona. 
Or we may call a fellow by the name of Herb, and I 
apologize I don't know Herb's last name, but one of the two 
will be here. 
THE COURT: They are from Page? 
MR. WINCHESTER: No, from the Sedona area. 
THE COURT: Sedona. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Um-hmm. Denise Rosales, Cameron, 
Arizona. Then Dan Watson, who is now with the Fredonia 
Marshal, but still lives here in Kanab. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hummel. 
MR. HUMMEL: My name is John Hummel. I am 
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originally from Richfield, Utah. Grew up there. Born 
there. Went to school there. I married a Richfield girl. 
I married way over my head. And my duty in life is to try 
to keep up with her. And we have five children. All of 
them are youngsters. We are coping with our first teenager 
right now. He's 13. That, for my hairline. 
I am a resident of St. George right now. 
Although, I have been coming to Kanab area since about 1990 
quite regularly. So some of your faces are quite familiar. 
I am the defense attorney in this case. And, 
obviously, I represent the two defendants in this matter. 
Let me tell you about them. The first is Robert Beltran. 
Hefs originally from Prescott, Arizona. He was in the 
construction arena. He did construction, was a heavy 
equipment mechanic for about 3 5 years. He had an 
industrial accident in 1983 and also fell off of a piece of 
equipment and fell 32 feet and injured his back. He was 
disabled. Attempted --he moved to Arizona to open a 
mechanic shop there, and auto repair service area there, a 
garage with seven bays, an ambitious project. He closed 
that down based on doctor's orders and came to Kanab to 
assist Dee Carpenter, his friend, in running a restaurant 
here in town. 
Dee is originally from Scottsdale, Arizona. After 
graduating from high school, she married her sweet heart 
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and spent a lot of years involved in military lifestyle. 
Her husband was sent to •-- I can't say the name. 
DEFENDANT CARPENTER: Enskooky (phonetic). 
MR. HUMMEL: Okay. Air force fighter in Japan, as 
air force fighter pilot. She went to the University of 
Maryland. And she managed in, or majored in restaurant/ 
hotel management. She came back to Williams Field Air 
Force Base in Chandler, Arizona. And her husband, 
unfortunately, at that point, was sent to Viet Nam in '68 
to 1970. After -- in 1971 he contracted a brain stem 
encephalitis as a result of insect bite and passed away. 
She's a widow. 
She worked for Del Webb Corporation and had 
managed a private club for several years. She then got 
into the food and beverage business, and was in that for 2 9 
years. She has owned and operated the Frontier Barbecue & 
Steak House here in Kanab. That's south of town on the 
way, basically, across the street from the Rancho's 
turnout -- turn-in there or turnout, I guess, depending on 
which way you are going. And she leased the property there 
for a while, later owned the property and managed the 
property. She is one of the defendants in this case. 
Our witnesses are, may potentially include the 
following: Joe Johnson, Don Cox, Sandy Banks, Janna Aston, 
Mack Williams, Joan Matson, George Kelly, Mark Riddle, Ron 
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Glover, Taylor Buttons, Pete Martin, Gordon Bishop, and 
also some people who are not from this area. Well, one of 
them has some ties to the area. John Blundell, and Ray 
Carpenter. He's no relation to Dee Carpenter. He is a 
master electrician from St. George. And Jim Cropf. 
C-r-o-p-f. Those are the folks we anticipate having as 
witnesses, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hummel. All right. 
I'm going to ask you now about relationships with anyone 
who has been identified either as a party, either of the 
defendants, either of the lawyers, or any one who has been 
named as a potential witness. Keep that group in mind. 
And I'll ask you first, is there anyone of you who is 
related to any of those persons as close as a first cousin? 
All right. Let me start up here and on the back row. 
Any --as close as a first cousin to anyone who's been 
identified. 
JUROR: Personal? 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me get to the back row. 
Mrs. Burgoyne. 
MS. BURGOYNE: John is my brother-in-law, 
THE COURT: Tell me exactly how that relationship 
arises. . 
MS. BURGOYNE: His --my husband -- Curtis's 
sister is married to John. 
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THE COURT: The statute is pretty specific about 
the blood relationships. And so I'm going to have to 
excuse Wendy Burgoyne and Curtis Burgoyne and Kent Anderson 
and A. Lynn Button, Amy L. Sorensen, Raleigh Franklin and 
Mrs. Alldredge. I thank each one of you for your 
attendance here today. I am confident that you would be 
very good jurors, but I'm not able to use you. Thank you. 
JUROR: Judge, Jamie White is my wife's aunt. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll get --
JUROR: Does that matter? 
THE COURT: No. T h a t ' s n o t - -
JUROR: T h a t ' s a t r y . 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'll get some more 
general relationships in just a moment. Okay. We have 
dealt with the blood relationships. Now, I'm obliged to 
deal with some other relationships. Listen carefully. Do 
any of you have, with any of these persons that have been 
named, a debtor/creditor relationship? You owe them money 
or they owe you money? Court hears none. 
Guardian/ward relationship? Court hears none. 
Master/servant relationship? Which tells you how 
long this law has been around. Court hears none. 
Employer --
JUROR: Excuse me. Explain that a little. Do I 
work for one of those people that's been named? 
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THE 
or employee. 
COURT: Well, that's the next one. Employer 
Employer or employee relationship. All 
right. Mr. Hunter. Tell me. 
MR. 
called. 
THE 
MR. 
HUNTER: Ron Glover is one of the witnesses 
COURT: Was he named, Mr. Winchester? 
WINCHESTER: Not on my list. 
Is that on your list? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
cold, I work 
directions. 
THE 
now, but you 
MR. 
j THE 
MR. 
;• '.-.••' THE 
role there? 
MR. 
THE 
responsibilil 
HUMMEL: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. Ron Glover. 
HUNTER: Um-hmm. 
COURT: And tell me what your relationship is. 
HUNTER: I work on the off-year -- when it's 
at the lumber yard. And I go by his 
I work for him. 
COURT: So I see you are not working with him 
did some in the wintertime? 
HUNTER: Yes. 
COURT: Does he own the lumber yard? 
HUNTER: No. 
COURT: But he has some kind of supervisory 
HUNTER: Yes. 
COURT: Let me tell you what your 
:y, each one of you, would be. Each one of you 
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who serves would have the responsibility to listen 
carefully to the evidence and base your verdict solely on 
the evidence, not influenced by relationships. You would 
have to approach your assignment honestly and with 
integrity. And if a relationship would compromise your 
integrity in some way, then that would be of some concern 
to me. If you were -- you explained this relationship 
which is not a true employer/employee situation, off-season 
you have, you work for the same owner, I guess, and have 
some relationship. If you were a juror, could you base 
your verdict in this case solely on the evidence in court 
uninfluenced by that relationship? 
MR. HUNTER: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Now, let me just go down 
this other row. Employer/employee relationships on the 
front? No. And to you, Ms. McAllister? 
MS. MCALLISTER: Yes. I was kind of temporarily 
hired as they were opening up of the restaurant. I did 
some sewing for her. I do --
THE COURT: How long ago has that been? 
MS. MCALLISTER: Three years ago, maybe. Whenever 
they first opened. About three years ago. 
THE COURT: All right. And how long of time did 
you work? 
MS. MCALLISTER: Oh, just three weeks at the most, 
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somewhere in there. I made some aprons for them before 
they opened up the business. 
THE COURT: After that three weeks or so, did you 
maintain any further employer/employee relationship? 
MS. MCALLISTER: No. 
THE COURT: Did you maintain a close personal 
relationship? 
MS. MCALLISTER: No. 
THE COURT: No. Was there anything about that 
experience there that would cause you to be for or against 
either side in this case? That's just a yes or no. 
Anything that would cause you to be for or against? 
- MS. MCALLISTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to --
that's the kind of question, then, that I'm going to deal 
with in chambers private. And if there are any other 
answers that would be inappropriate to disclose to 
everyone, I'm going to give you a chance to visit with me 
privately. So I'm going to pass on that for right now and 
just make a note. 
Now, let me go on down. Next employer/employee 
relationship on the front row. Next row. No. Okay. I'm 
down, then, to you, Mr. Trudell. Who is your relationship 
with? 
MR. TRUDELL: Well, I would ask you a question, if 
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or they owe him anything? 
MS. WALKER: No. 
THE COURT: They do not? 
MS. WALKER: No. 
THE COURT: Were you personally involved with 
them? 
MS. WALKER: No, 
THE COURT: Is there anything about that 
relationship or the fact that he did work there, anything 
about that that would cause you to be biased for or against 
either side in this case? 
MS. WALKER: Yeah, maybe. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll visit with you. 
Thank you. Anyone else employer/employee? Court hears 
none. 
Next one. Any one of you a partner with any of 
these persons that have been identified? Court hears none. 
Any one of you a joint obligor with any of those 
persons, that is, together you owe somebody something? 
Court hears none. 
Does any one of you have an attorney/client 
relationship with either of the attorneys in this case? 
JUROR: Go to church with them. 
THE COURT: Beg your pardon? 
JUROR: Go to church with them. 
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THE COURT: No. Attorney/client relationship. 
Court hears none. 
Any one of you have a landlord/tenant 
relationship? Court hears none. 
All right. I'm going to ask about those broader 
classifications. I'm going to ask you about general 
acquaintances with the parties, the lawyers, any of the 
witnesses. But I'm going to preface it first with an 
example or two. We live in a -- we live in a fairly 
sparsely populated area. It is not uncommon for persons to 
know almost everyone else in town, and even in the county 
for that matter. Your acquaintances would likely carry 
over to Glendale and Orderville and maybe on out to Big 
Water or Church Wells. So I am aware of that. 
I live in Richfield, a little larger, but, still, 
I know most people in town. I'm not concerned about 
general acquaintanceships. I live across the street from 
Jim Forsey, who is family, made Forsey Ice Cream for many 
years. And he and I play golf together on occasion. And 
we fish together on occasion. And we are close, 
sufficiently close that it would not be appropriate for me 
to participate on a jury in which he was a witness or had 
something at stake. So now I'm going to have to ask each 
one of you to think about all these persons and see if we 
can sort out relationships that could compromise personal 
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integrity or fairness. I ask you to carefully think about 
it, not as a way of being excused, but as way of honest 
appraisal of the circumstance. 
Now, going to start back through the list. Any 
one of you who has such a close relationship with someone 
who's been identified that it would, you would feel like it 
would preclude you from listening from the evidence and 
deciding the case honestly and fairly? Anyone? Starting 
with Mr. Johnson and going down the back row. Any 
relationship there? Mr. Evangelista. 
MR. EVANGELISTA: I don't know if it's a close 
relationship, but I feel probably working at the newspaper 
I do see Mr. Winchester every couple days. He hasn't 
spoken a word to me, of course, about this case. But I 
have heard from many other people about this case, and I 
feel that I might bring that up. 
THE COURT: I'm going to be talking about exposure 
to the case further along. But I'm now concerned about, 
just about whether you see him every day, I don't care as 
long as you can make independent judgments. 
MR. EVANGELISTA: Sure. 
THE COURT: Could you do that? 
MR. EVANGELISTA: Sure. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else on the back 
row? This front row, any other relationships that would 
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THE COURT: All right. I'll consider that then in 
chambers. Okay. Now, anyone else have a close 
relationship? Mr. Aiken. 
MR. AIKEN: Yes. Keith Robinson and I are good 
fishing friends, hiking and camping. 
THE COURT: Would he be one of many or kind of a 
singular friend? 
MR. AIKEN: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: Would he be one of many friends or 
would he be extra special? 
MR. AIKEN: He's extra special. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I kind of asked for 
that one. All right. Now, I'm down to you, Mr. Brown? 
MR. BROWN: Well, I know a number of them, but Joe 
Johnson as well as Pete Martin. As a bouncer of the bar, I 
have talked with them quite a bit. Pete's been a friend 
for a long time, helped him out of a lot of bad situations. 
THE COURT: And he's one of the witnesses? 
MR, BROWN: Um-hmm. 
,.'%';:'•' THE COURT: Well, I'll visit with you and you can 
tell me about it. I'll visit with you privately. Okay. 
Anyone else? Court hears none. 
Now, I'm going to ask about relationships with law 
enforcement. Is there any one of you who has -- this does 
not necessarily disqualify you, I just want to know about 
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these relationships -- any one of you have a close family 
member who is involved as a full time law enforcement 
officer? All right. Let's talk about -- Miss Harris, you 
have someone. 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: I have. My younger brother is 
employed with Kanab City Police department. And my 
brother-in-law is employed with Kanab Police full time. 
THE COURT: Two. Your younger brother? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And brother-in-law? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: Kane County. 
THE COURT: Okay. As we visit about these 
relationships, let me just tell you that you are going to 
hear testimony from law enforcement personnel. And you are 
going to hear testimony from persons of other professions. 
I don't know what all the professions will be, whether they 
will be ranchers or plumbers or rock shop operators or 
school teachers. Whoever it is, it would be your 
responsibility to listen carefully to the testimony and to 
give every witness, witness' testimony fair consideration 
without regard t.o that person's profession. So the 
question that I will put to you is, would you give undue 
weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer versus 
the testimony of a school teacher or someone from some 
other profession? 
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MS. WENDY HARRIS: I think they are all equal. 
THE COURT: And you feel in your mind you could 
treat them all --
'MS. WENDY HARRIS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, 
Miss Flatberg, did you have someone --
MS. FLATBERG: No. 
THE COURT: -- close association with law 
enforcement officers? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yes. My brother works for the 
county as an officer. 
THE COURT: And that's your brother? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, on these where we are 
getting some identification of some family relationship, 
perhaps I'll ask the court, would it be appropriate to find 
out who they are so we'll know? 
THE COURT: Sure- Tell us who --
MR. HUMMEL: We would have to backtrack on the 
• • • • ' 
last one, I'm afraid. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go back. And, 
Ms. Harris, you tell us who your brother is. 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: My brother is Billy Crosby --
William Crosby. And brother-in-law is Brian Harris. 
THE COURT: Crosby and Harris? 
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MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: What if you disagreed with each other? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Have a brawl. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you could be wholly 
independent in your judgment? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And, Miss Harris, could you be 
independent in your judgment? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, I'm 
talking about relationship with a police officer. Anyone 
else on this front? All right. Mr. Tullis? 
MS. TULLIS: My first cousin, Erik Cullen, is 
working with the sherifffs department and city police. 
THE COURT: First cousin, Cullen. Does he have 
any involvement in this case that you are aware of? 
MR. WINCHESTER: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Could you give each, the testimony of 
each witness fair consideration, not giving undue weight to 
the testimony of an officer? 
MS. TULLIS: It would be equal. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anyone else on 
this front row now? Now, I'm down to your row, 
Miss McAllister. Any relationships along that row? Close 
relationships with police officers, family? Hearing none. 
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MR. KEGEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: And by your son's training? 
MR. KEGEL: (Juror nodded head affirmatively.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else? Mr. Linton, 
I'm going to visit with you anyway. We can talk about it. 
Remind me to talk about it. Okay. Anyone else? 
Relationship with a law enforcement officer. Court hears 
none. 
For the record, the charges in this case are 
charges of arson. Is there any one of you who has had any 
involvement either as a victim or an investigator or had a. 
close association with someone who's been a victim in an 
arson case? Anyone? Court hears none. 
Any one of you who has been charged or accused in 
a case relating to arson? And I'll allow you to visit with 
me privately if there is something we should visit about. 
Court hears none. 
This case has been the subject of newspaper 
articles and perhaps media coverage beyond the newspaper. 
I'm going to ask you now what exposure you have had to this 
case. If your only exposure is through the media, 
newspapers or otherwise, tell me. If it's some other kind 
of exposure, then I may want to visit with you privately 
about that. So let me find out who's heard about the case. 
Starting on the back row, any prior knowledge of this case, 
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in the newspaper is wholly accurate. Very valuable service 
in our society, in our culture. But, in this trial, you 
are going to hear from the people who were there, the 
people who participated in the investigation. You are 
going to get direct information from the very best sources 
that can be brought to bare. If you were to serve on this 
jury, it would be your responsibility to set aside what you 
may have heard in common gossip or what you may have read 
in the newspaper or heard on radio or television. You 
would have to be able to do that. So I'm going to be 
asking you if you can, in fact, do that. 
All right. Now, wait. I'll get back down here to 
Mr. Hunter. You say you have heard some common --
MR. HUNTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll visit briefly with 
you. Front row? Anyone here heard any media information 
or stories about it? 
MS. GOULDING: I have a son and daughter and 
son-in-law that lives here that sold me a lot, and he's a 
friend of Colin1s. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll visit with you, 
Miss Goulding. Miss Jacob. 
MS. JACOBS: Just what was in the paper. 
THE WITNESS: You read? 
MS. JACOBS: Yes. I'm out of the loop. I'm out 
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of the gossip. 
THE COURT: So we know what you have seen, 
whatever was in the newspaper? 
MS. JACOBS: Just in the local paper. And that 
was quite a while ago. And I have forgotten most of it. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you, if you 
were selected as a juror, could you set aside anything that 
you may have read in the newspaper and base your verdict 
solely on what you hear in open court? 
MS. JACOBS: I would take it on what the witnesses 
said and judge it objectively. 
THE COURT: And you could do that? 
MS. JACOBS: Oh, yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Yes. Mr. Thebeau. 
MR. THEBEAU: Yes. I deal quite a bit with Stan 
White, the building inspector. And we have discussed 
things that occurred during that time. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I think I need to 
visit with you. 
•MR. JUSTIN JONES: Just what I have read in the 
newspaper. 
THE COURT: Have you had conversations with others 
or just read it in the newspaper? 
MR. JUSTIN JONES: Just gossip. 
THE COURT: Let me come down to you, now. 
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JUROR: I know two of the witnesses. I spoke to 
them about it. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll visit with you. 
Anyone else along this front row that's had any exposure to 
this case? Court hears none. I'm to you, Mr. Adair. 
Anyone along that? Okay. I'm to you, Mr. Anderson. 
MR. JAMES ANDERSON: Media, newspaper. And also 
some of the witnesses have talked to me about that. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll visit with you. Now, 
back to second row. Milligan. Anyone along there? I am 
going to be visiting already with Mr. Taylor, 
Ms. Chamberlain. 
MR. KEGEL; 
THE COURT: 
newspaper? 
MR. KEGEL; 
I just read the newspaper. 
That's your only source is the 
Yes. 
THE COURT: You have not discussed the case with 
other people? 
MR. KEGEL: No. 
THE COURT: So we know what you know. Now, let me 
ask you, if you were a juror, can you set aside and base 
your verdict solely on the evidence that comes forth in 
court? 
MR. KEGEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else there? All 
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would cause you to be unable to serve in this case fairly? 
MR. REED: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else along the back 
row? All right. Court hears -- oh, thank you. Let's see, 
Miss Wetzel. 
MS. WETZEL: I was on a case for six months in 
criminal charges. Five defendants guilty. 
THE COURT: Where was that. 
MS.' WETZEL: San Diego. All guilty but one. 
THE COURT: Well, that was very extensive 
experience. Anything about that experience that would 
cause you to question your ability to be fair and objective 
in this case? 
MS. WETZEL: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else? Court hears 
none. Is there anything that I have not. touched on best 
known to yourself that would cause you to question your 
ability to be fair to both sides and to base your verdict 
solely on the evidence? If there is something that we 
should visit about, we can either do it here or I'll do it 
in chambers. Anything that would cause you to question 
your ability to be fair? 
should 
should 
Mr. 
pose 
deal 
Winchester, 
Anyone? 
are there 
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questions that I 
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MR. WINCHESTER: I have one, Your Honor. You have 
asked about relationships with law enforcement officers. 
Because of the nature of this case, I think it would be 
appropriate to ask about relationships with fire fighters. 
THE COURT: All right. That's a fair question. 
Relationships with fire fighters. Anyone along the back 
row? In the box. Court hears none. Well, okay. 
Miss Harris. 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: My brother-in-law is a 
volunteer fireman. 
THE COURT: Your brother-in-law is a volunteer 
fireman in Kanab? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: No. Orderville. 
THE COURT: Did he have any involvement in this 
case that you are aware of? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: No. 
THE COURT: No? Would the fact that he's a 
volunteer fireman in Orderville have any impact on your 
ability to hear the evidence here and to judge this case 
fairly? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: No. 
THE COURT: You are confident you could hear the 
evidence and base your verdict solely on the evidence? 
MS. WENDY HARRIS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else on the back 
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row? Court hears none. Front row in the box. Court hears 
none. All right. Back on the first row in the audience. 
Does anyone there have a relationship with a volunteer 
fireman or a fire fighter or a full time fire fighter any 
place? Court hears none. All right. Mr. Anderson. 
MR. JAMES ANDERSON: I have been on the department 
for 14 years. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And you have explained that. 
And you have trained most of these officers. I remember. 
All right. Anyone else? Next row. Anyone have any 
relationship with a fire fighter, volunteer or full time? 
Mr. Linton, I'm going to visit with you. Okay. 
Anyone else? 
All right. Ifm going to be visiting with you, 
Mr. Trudell. 
And, Mr. Brown, visiting with you. 
Mr. Aiken, I'm visiting with you. Anyone else? 
Make sure that you visit about that when I visit with you. 
Okay. Any other questions? 
MR. WINCHESTER: None here. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hummel? 
MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, I think I have some notes 
about this, but I better make sure. I am wondering if 
there are any family relationships with other people who 
are prospective jurors. 
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THE COURT: Well, we know this one, the Harris 
relationship. 
MR. HUMMEL: I know of that one. 
THE COURT: That's a fair question. Are there 
other --
MR. HUMMEL: I think three and four are. 
MR. EVANGELISTA: Yeah. Mother and son. 
THE COURT: All right. Mother and son. 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: My wife's over there. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's start right with you, 
Miss Flatberg. 
MS. FLATBERG: I am Mike Evangelista's mother. 
THE COURT: Would there be any concern on your 
part to want to agree with your son if you didn't see the 
evidence the same way that he saw it? 
MS. FLATBERG: Not really. 
THE COURT: Do you think you could make an 
independent decision? 
MS. FLATBERG: Yes. 
dicision? 
THE COURT: And what if it's different than his 
MS. FLATBERG: He'll live with it. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Evangelista. 
MR. EVANGELISTA: You did it. I'm proud of you. 
THE COURT: Suppose you disagreed with your 
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own judgment, by I do have trouble with his. 
THE COURT: Well --
MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, his judgment must be good 
because he married her. 
THE COURT: You have to assure me both ways. You 
have to assure me that you wouldn't go against him just 
because he's your husband, or you wouldn't agree with him 
because he's your husband. Can you exercise independent 
judgment? 
MRS. AUDREY TULLIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Other relationships as 
close as first cousin? 
MR. WINCHESTER: Your Honor, you have one here on 
the front row, unless I missed it. 
MS. GOULDING: Son-in-law right back there. 
THE COURT: Who is your son-in-law? 
MS. GOULDING: Louis Pratt. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to be visiting 
with Mr. Pratt. Suppose you disagree with him? 
MS. GOULDING: Of course. All the time. 
THE COURT: Are you confident you could be 
independent in your judgment? 
MS. GOULDING: Probably not, no. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, anyone 
else? Mr. Hummel, any other questions I should put to the 
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whole group? 
MR. HUMMEL: Actually, I have one potential one. 
Perhaps we should approach. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Whereupon, a sidebar conference 
was held off the record.) 
THE COURT: Is there any one of you who is aware 
of either of these attorneys representing someone or being 
involved in a case where you had something at stake or 
where someone else did, and you came out of that case with 
some feelings antagonistic to either of these attorneys 
that would potentially carry over here? Any one aware of 
such a relationship? All right. 
Miss Goulding, you shook your head. I'm going 
to -- I'll visit with you. I'll note that. Anyone else 
that's had some association with a case where one of these 
lawyers were involved but because of that you hold some ill 
feelings? All right. Miss Guevarra, I'll visit with you. 
Anyone else? Now, Mr. Hummel, do I need to be more 
specific than that? 
MR. HUMMEL: I --
THE COURT: Mr. Winchester, do I need to be more 
specific? 
MR. HUMMEL: I told the court my concerns. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't have any problem about 
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being more specific. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Your Honor, I was aware of one 
potential issue, but that juror has already been excused so 
I don't need to explore it any further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hummel disclosed that he 
represented, for some years represented the Division of 
Child and Family Services and worked on their cases. Is 
there any one of you who's had a case involving the 
Division of Child and Family Services where you had contact 
with -- cause an adverse or bias towards --•. ' 
MR. HUMMEL: Your Honor, perhaps even since I was 
an assistant Attorney General, perhaps they may have some 
involvement with the Attorney General's Office. 
THE COURT: He was the Deputy Attorney General at 
the time. Anyone who had involvement with the Attorney 
General's Office in any way that would carry over to 
Mr. Hummel? In the course of our lives, we wear many hats. 
You do not have that relationship now? 
MR. HUMMEL: No. 
THE COURT: But you are concerned about any 
carry-over from a prior case? 
MR. HUMMEL: That's right. 
THE COURT: Anyone have any concern arising out of 
a prior case or any bias or sympathy for or against either 
side? Court hears none. Anyone else? Anything else, 
100 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. WINCHESTER: Um-hmm. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll talk to him. And 
Harris, Blane Harris. He and his sister, I haven't heard 
anything from either one of them that suggests --I'll 
visit with her. 
MR. HUMMEL: My concern is, again, we have 
relatives there. Most often the way they resolve -- I 
mean, I have seen other cases resolved. They take the 
lowest number and take the other member off of it, if it's 
just a relative issue. 
THE COURT: I don't think they are automatically 
disqualified. I inquired pretty carefully about it. I'll 
interview -- I'm going to be interviewing him anyway. 
Number 13 was Goulding. 
MR. HUMMEL: We skipped number six. Darren 
Coleman is his first cousin. Tullis. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's see. Did I already --
MR. WINCHESTER: My notes say you were going to 
talk with him, but I don't remember why. Okay. Marc 
Hunter, you were going to. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MR. HUMMEL: I'm not saying I have any specific --
THE COURT: Six, I was going to -- I don't have 
any specific problem identifying. I thought you wanted to 
go through all the ones that you were going to talk with. 
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MR. WINCHESTER: Sorry about that. 
THE COURT: Sit down, if you will, Mr. Harris. 
You indicated you had had some -- you had a possible 
relationship, then also you heard about the case. Tell us 
about the relationship first. 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: About my brother being on the 
police force? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: He's actually a jailer here. 
THE COURT: We talked about that at some length. 
You indicated that would not compromise your ability to 
judge the case. Do you feel that way? 
MR. BLAME HARRIS: Um-hmm. 
THE COURT: You are sure you can be fair? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. HUMMEL: Was that the source of some 
information on the case? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: No. He -- I don't know how 
long ago the fire happened. But he hasn't been -- well, I 
was on my mission when he got the job there. And just 
recently he is going to have a promotion. He's going to be 
patrolling. 
THE COURT: What else did you hear about the case 
that you could tell us? 
MR. BLAME HARRIS: Basically, the town stuff. 
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THE COURT: Like what? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: I don't know in specific. Just 
how this was a fire there and some people suspected that it 
was caused by someone. You know, I don't really know the 
people here in Kanab that well, so I don't really know. I 
wouldn't be able to say a name if they even told me. I 
really don't know. 
THE COURT: The folks that were charged have pled 
not guilty. They are entitled to be, and the law presumes, 
that they are innocent. 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Um-hmm. 
THE COURT: If you were a juror, could you go into 
this trial presuming they are innocent? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: Definitely. 
THE COURT: Now, was there anything else, Mr. 
Winchester? 
MR. WINCHESTER: Not here. 
MR. HUMMEL: How long have you been back from your 
mission? 
MR. BLANE HARRIS: I -- see, June 22nd of last 
year. I have come --
MR. HUMMEL: All right. I don't have any other 
questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks so ever much. 
Either one of you challenge? 
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Who is he? 
WINCHESTER: Former 
a witness for the state. 
THE COURT: 
lot of buddies in hi 
MS. TULLIS: 
Okay. So I 
gh school. 
friends 
Thank you. 
things to add. Jim 
at one time. He's 
you are Mr. Tullis? 
were best friends with? . 
s son. And I know him. 
buddies in high school. 
Kanab City police officer. 
'm clear on that. I have a 
Just wanted to let you now. 
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We have 
THE 
35. 
cause, let's 
MR. 
keep Don Tay] 
that. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Now, let's see, how many have I got? 
So I have plenty. Any other challenges for 
deal wit :h right now. 
WINCHESTER: Not here. I have no reason to 
.or around unless we have already resolved 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
Scott Johnson. 
against 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
him. 
THE 
MR. 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
Okay. I'll excuse him. 
I agree with that. 
Now, first, let's go down through. 
He's not related to anybody, right? 
No. 
Okay. So I don't have any for cause 
All right. Now, I have Wendy Harris. 
She's got a lot of involvement with 
law enforcement. But I don't have any specific for cause 
against 
Harris. 
her. 
THE 
MR. 
same concern 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
I had. 
influence brother to 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
She is a brother or sister to Blane 
Yeah. That's the -- see, that's the 
We can't ask them if there would be an 
sister. 
I did ask them. 
Did you? 
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THE COURT: 
both assured me. 
THE BAILIFF 
MR. HUMMEL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
either one of them. 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
notes about him. 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HUMMEL: 
THE COURT: 
Um-hmm. I did on the stand. They 
Sister-in-law. 
So -- oh, it's a sister-in-law. 
Sister-in-law, yeah.. 
I don't have any specific against 
The same with Rhonda Flatberg? 
No. 
Okay. Marc Hunter? 
No. 
All right. Orval Heaton? 
No» And I really don't have any 
Okay. Shirl Spencer? 
No. 
Justin Jones? 
He's the rancher, right? No. 
Frances Jacobs. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Judge, let me disclose something 
on Frances Jacobs. rhere has been a dispute in this county 
over a road that leads to her house. People that own the 
property ahead of he 
Kane County wants to 
County has been sued 
r would like to close the road off. 
keep the road open publicly. Kane 
by the people in front of her. Their 
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about for cause. And you 
anyway. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
If we are not goi 
Sharon Wetze] 
McCrory 
51. "' '. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
said you wouldn't --
Well, we won't get down to 
.ng to get down that far, then 
No problem. 
So on the whole list --
I just have one question. On 
, what's the number you have for him? Is he 50 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
challenged for cause 
MR. 
THE 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
that then. So we've 
others. 
think I 
peremptc 
court. 
Question is 
Fifty-one on my list. But --
Okay. 
Now, so the only one you have 
is Donnie Riddle? 
The only remaining one, yes. 
him 
L 
or | 
All right. Well, I'm going to grant 
got, 
, how 
we are stipulated on all the 
many shall I have come back? 
've got to let them go to lunch now. 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
Dries 
MR. 
THE 
CLERK: 
COURT: 
Some 
Yes. 
WINCHESTER: 
or four 
HUMMEL: 
COURT: 
But you have 
of them are getting sick. 
First, page 10. 
Is the defense going to have 
for each client? 
Don 
Well, 
t I get four for each client: 
it's discretionary with the 
one lawyer and a common defense. 
I 
four 
> 
i ^ i 
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do this, if you want. I'll give you five, but require you 
to go first. If you want, one extra one. 
MR. HUMMEL: How about six, and I do them both? 
THE COURT: Well, you know, if there is some 
reason, but you passed all of them for cause. 
MR. HUMMEL: You have --a for cause and a 
peremptory are completely different. 
THE COURT: You know, the rule says you get four. 
But each side gets four. Where there are multiple 
defendants I can require that they exercise them in unison, 
or I can grant additional one. But where you have the same 
lawyer on a common defense, I have a hard time justifying 
too much of a variation. If you want to stipulate to 
something else, I'll allow it. 
MR. HUMMEL: Six. And I do the first 2. 
MR. WINCHESTER: Fine. 
THE COURT: All right. Stipulated. So we are 
going to end up, we need 10 and 10. We need 20? I've got 
12 on this first page. Twenty-two takes me down through 
Geiger. Suppose I have that group come back after lunch. 
MR. WINCHESTER: McCrory we excused. 
MR. HUMMEL: Maybe we ought to read them real 
fast. 
THE COURT: There is 21 to there. 
MR. HUMMEL: Shall I read what I have and see if 
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1 they are 
2 THE COURT: If I can get 21. Twenty-four come 
3 back after lunch. That gets me down to through Budd 
4 Chavis. And we'll excuse the last page. 
5 MR. HUMMEL: Okay. 
6 MR. WINCHESTER: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: Then something should happen over 
8 lunch hour. We got 24 coming back. 
9 THE CLERK: Something as in a settlement? 
10 THE COURT: No. I'll have these 24 come back 
11 after lunch. Then we'll exercise the peremptories. 
12 MR. WINCHESTER: What do you anticipate the 
13 afternoon being? Unfortunately, I have miscalculated and I 
14 have several witnesses. Maybe I need to send several home 
15 until tomorrow morning. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I'm willing to stay as long as 
17 you want. It won't take us very long to get through these 
18 peremptories. 
19 MR. WINCHESTER: Then we have some jury 
20 instructions, opening arguments. 
21 MR. HUMMEL: Are you inclined to read only your 
22 stock jury instructions or --. 
23 THE COURT: I am. At the beginning I'll just read 
24 those stocks. 
25 MR. HUMMEL: Plus the information. 
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Addendum E 
Order Denying Motion For New Trial 
(BR 290-93; CR 427-75) 
Addendum E 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
J. CHRISTIAN RASMUSSEN [8267] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84 741 
Telephone: (435) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (435) 644-8156 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT BELTRAN, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on November 22, 2000, and 
again on December 22, 2000, pursuant to Defendant's motion for a 
new trial. The State of Utah was represented by the Kane County 
Attorney, Colin R. Winchester. The Defendant was present and was 
represented by counsel, John E. Hummel. Defendant's motion was 
based on two grounds: first, that juror Justin Jones was not a 
resident of Kane County at the time of his jury service in this 
*Q* 
<*2 4)0/ 
****. icrt C<W 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 981600101 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
STATE OF UTAH V. ROBERT BELTRAN 
Case No. 981600101 
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matter; and second, that the prosecutor's spouse, Rebecca 
Winchester, had engaged in conversations with one or more of the 
jurors during trial recesses. 
Defendant had submitted affidavits in support of the 
allegations. Defendant proffered motor vehicle records which 
showed that one or more of Mr. Jones's vehicles was registered in 
the State of Arizona. The parties stipulated that Mr. Jones held 
a valid Utah driver license, and'that he was registered to vote 
in Utah. The Defendant called juror Wendy Harris, alternate 
juror Cheryl Brown, and Mrs. Winchester. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Justin Jones was a resident of Kane County at the time 
of his jury service in this matter. His residence was in Kanab, 
Utah, though he worked on a ranch in Arizona. Based on the 
evidence before the Court, there is insufficient evidence to 
grant Defendant=s motion on this issue. 
2. Regarding the alleged conversation between juror Wendy 
Harris and Mrs. Winchester, Mrs. Winchester testified that there 
may have been one brief conversation, amounting to no more than 
common courtesy, at or near a soda vending machine. Ms. Harris 
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN 
Case No. 981600101 
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testified that she did not recall having had any conversation 
with Mrs. Winchester during the trial, and that she did not know 
Mrs. Winchester at the time of the trial. Both Mrs. Winchester 
and Ms. Harris denied discussing the trial or anything related 
thereto. Based on the evidence before the Court, there is 
insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of 
the conversation between Ms. Harris and Mrs. Winchester. 
3. Regarding the alleged conversation between alternate 
juror Cheryl Brown and Mrs. Winchester, Mrs. Winchester testified 
that she engaged in one conversation with Ms. Brown during a 
recess, and that the conversation was limited to a discussion 
regarding a community musical production in which both were 
involved. Ms. Brown testified that there may have been more than 
one such conversation, but that any conversation with Mrs. 
Winchester during the trial was limited to issues other than the 
trial. Based on the evidence before the Court, there is 
insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of 
the conversation between Ms. Brown and Mrs. Winchester. 
4. Regarding the alleged comment from among a group of 
women, one of whom was identified as Mrs. Winchester, at the rear 
of the courtroom, in which an unidentified woman commented that 
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN 
Case No. 981600101 
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she was confused about an expert witness's testimony, there is 
insufficient evidence to support that any juror overheard the 
comment. Based on the evidence before the Court, there is 
insufficient evidence to grant Defendant=s motion as a result of 
the comment. 
5. Based on the above findings, the Court denies the 
motion for a new trial. 
6. Defendant shall remain free on bail pending further 
hearing on February 16, 2001 at 9:30 a.m. 
DATED this 20th day of February, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
STATE OF UTAH v. ROBERT BELTRAN 
Case No. 981600101 
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